
The Self-Conscious and Social Emotions: A Personality and Social-Functionalist Account

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In his memoir *Ultramarathon Man*, Dean Karnazes explains how he first became an ultralong-distance runner, regularly racing 50-100 miles at a clip. Early in his adulthood, Karnazes was an accomplished businessman, using a hard-earned MBA to rise in the ranks of a corporate job. He was successful, but dissatisfied. Then, on his 30th birthday, Karnazes had an epiphany. He realized that the life he had been living was not one that allowed him to feel good about his authentic sense of self. To create an identity in which he could feel genuine pride, he needed to make a change. Beginning with a spontaneous 30-mile run out his door that night, Karnazes turned his life around, eventually building a career that now allows him to spend all day (and often all night) running (Karnazes, 2005).

What caused this massive behavioral shift? A trait-oriented approach would suggest that Karnazes possesses traits such as conscientiousness and openness, and these stable dispositional tendencies allowed him to make a major change in his life and then persist in what had to be incredibly grueling path. Although such an account provides some understanding of Karnazes’ unusual life choices, his behaviors were also shaped by emotions – and functionalist approaches to emotion suggest that distinct emotions provide the motivational underpinnings of most (if not all) human behaviors. But Karnazes’ decision to trade in a promising business career for a life of long-distance running cannot be explained by such “basic emotions” as fear, anger, or happiness. As a successful salesperson happily married to the love of his life, Karnazes had surely attained the foundational goals that these emotions evolved to help humans achieve: survival and reproduction. Yet somehow, this was not enough. In fact, to understand why anyone would choose to subject himself to intense pain, frequent boredom, and the risk and uncertainty necessitated by a major post-graduate career change, we need to look beyond the basic emotions and fundamental evolutionary drives humans share with other animals, toward the more
cognitively complex, self-relevant, social emotions, and the uniquely human drive to build a meaningful identity and sense of self. To understand Karnazes’ personality, we need to examine self-conscious emotions, like pride and shame (Tracy, 2016).

We begin this chapter by explaining what we mean by social and self-conscious emotions, and why these emotions are particularly important to personality research. Next, we broadly review extant research findings on the self-conscious emotions, particularly as they pertain to personality. Several of these emotions have received a great deal of research attention, resulting in a considerable body of knowledge about their psychological experience, nonverbal expression, evolutionary origins, development, and impact on health and well-being. Finally, we provide a briefer overview of research findings on a handful of other social emotions that bear relevance to personality: gratitude, compassion, jealousy, envy, humility, and awe. Throughout the chapter, we highlight important future directions for personality research into all of these emotions.

**What are the Social Emotions, and how are they Relevant to Personality?**

To some extent all emotions are social, in the sense of functioning to help individuals navigate the social world. Even basic emotions like fear, anger, and disgust function, in part, to send evolutionarily significant interpersonal messages to social group members, as well as intrapsychic signals to the emotion-experiencing individual about his or her shifting environment and relationships. But some emotions are more purely social, in that they would not exist were it not for humans’ intensely social evolutionary history and our unique sense of self. These emotions evolved in humans to help us cope with the tasks that are essential to group living, such as bonding with potential mates, caring for children, establishing group loyalty, following and learning from leaders, and attaining status and influence over others. Although anger, fear, and sadness are instrumental to many of these processes, human societies and cultures have become
as complex and highly developed as they are in large part because of our uniquely human social emotions (Keltner & Tracy, in prep; Robins, Tracy, & Trzesniewski, 2008).

Since its inception, emotion research has been at least partially located within the broader field of personality psychology; many of the scholars who founded the contemporary study of affective science in the 1980s and 1990s were at the time personality or personality-oriented clinical researchers (e.g., Clark, Davidson, Ekman, Levenson, Russell, Tomkins, and Watson). Furthermore, emotions occupy a central position within several more specific approaches traditionally taken to the study of personality. For example, emotions have long been understood as the mechanisms by which human motivation is translated into concrete goal-directed behavior (e.g., McClelland, 1987; Murray, 1938); emotional stability (or neuroticism) is considered a major part of nearly all established trait taxonomies (e.g., John & Soto, this volume), and positive and negative affect are typically viewed as central components of subjective well-being (e.g., Diener & Lucas, 2008).

In the last two decades, personality psychologists have devoted increased attention to the study of distinct emotions and the social and self-conscious emotions in particular, often treating these constructs as personality dispositions, emotional pronenesses, or affective tendencies. As a result, the field has begun to accumulate considerable knowledge about how the trait-like tendency to experience emotions such as shame, guilt, pride, gratitude, compassion, jealousy, envy, and humility are related to a range of other personality processes and social behaviors.

What are the Self-Conscious Emotions?

The primary distinctive characteristic of self-conscious emotions is that their elicitation requires the ability to form stable self-representations (a “me” self), to focus attention on those representations (i.e., to self-reflect, or hold an “I” self; James, 1890), and put it all together to generate a self-evaluation (Tracy & Robins, 2004a). Complex self-evaluative processes are an
important part of both the direct causal processes that elicit self-conscious emotions (i.e., a proximal cause), and the ultimate evolutionary processes through which these emotions became part of the human repertoire (i.e., a distal cause).

At a distal level, self-conscious emotions exist because they motivate individuals to protect, defend, and enhance their self-representations, which in turn allows them to maintain their place in their social groups, avoid social rejection, and seek, attain, and maintain social rank (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2004a). All human societies reveal status differences among individuals, which influence patterns of conflict, resource allocation, and mating, and often facilitate coordination on group tasks (Berger, Rosenholtz & Zelditch, 1980). High-status individuals tend to hold disproportionate influence, while low-status individuals often passively give up these benefits, deferring to higher status group members. As a result, high status tends to promote greater fitness than low status, and a large body of evidence attests to a strong relation between social rank and fitness or wellbeing (e.g., Barkow, 1975; Hill, 1984). Self-conscious emotions may have evolved to coordinate and motivate behaviors essential to maintaining and attaining high status, or effectively coping with a drop in status.

At a more proximate level, self-conscious emotions guide individual behavior by compelling people to do things that are socially valued and avoid doing things that lead to social approbation. We strive to achieve, to be a good person, parent, friend, or partner, because doing so makes us proud of ourselves, and failing to do so makes us feel guilty or ashamed of ourselves. Society tells us what kind of person we should be; we internalize these beliefs in the form of actual and ideal self-representations; and self-conscious emotions motivate behavioral action toward the goals embodied in these self-representations. Although we might understand cognitively that hard work is valuable, it often takes the psychological force of emotions like guilt and pride to make us do those things we know are good for us (Tracy & Robins, 2004a;
Tracy, 2016). Ultimately, doing those good things is what ensures that we retain our place in society—and advance it.

**Pride.** One of the most notable aspects of pride is that it is not just one thing; scholars have commented upon pride’s dual-faceted nature for over a millennium. Its dark or “sinful” side has been widely cautioned against (see Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010; Tracy, 2016), while its more positive, pro-social, and achievement-oriented side tends to be just as widely cheered. Correspondingly, researchers have postulated distinct “hubristic” and “authentic” components of the emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2004a; 2007). Several lines of empirical research support this account, and suggest that individuals conceptualize and experience pride in terms of two very different categories of feelings (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Authentic pride is comprised of feelings of accomplishment, productivity, and self-worth, whereas hubristic pride is comprised of arrogance and conceit. At both the trait and state level, authentic pride is positively related to the socially desirable and generally adaptive Big Five traits of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experience, whereas hubristic pride is consistently negatively related to the two pro-social traits of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. People who tend to feel authentic pride also tend to have high self-esteem, at both an explicit and implicit level, whereas those who tend toward hubristic pride are more likely to have low implicit and explicit self-esteem, and be prone to shame and vulnerable or dysfunctional (as well as grandiose) forms of narcissism (Tracy & Robins, 2007; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009). Authentic pride is also positively associated with narcissism, but only with the grandiose, “healthy” form, consistent with the suggestion that the distinction between the two prides maps onto the well-noted distinction between genuine self-esteem and narcissism (Tracy, Cheng, Martens, & Robins, 2011).
The pride facets also differ in their associations with a wide range of social behaviors; each seems to underlie a different way of engaging with the social world and approaching one’s goals. Individuals high in dispositional authentic pride tend to be low in aggression, hostility, and rejection sensitivity; and high in life satisfaction, relationship satisfaction, dyadic adjustment, and social support, and they report secure attachments to their relationship partners. In contrast, individuals high in dispositional hubristic pride are more likely to engage in aggression, hostility, and other anti-social misbehaviors (e.g., drug use, petty crimes), and report lower dyadic adjustment and social support (Tracy et al., 2009). Not surprisingly, the facets are located in different quadrants of the Interpersonal Circumplex (i.e., the independent dimensions of agency and communion; Kiesler, 1983); although both are linked to high agency, individuals high in communion are prone to authentic pride, whereas those high in hubristic pride are low in communal traits (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). This distinction also plays out in goal striving. Both facets are positively related to an approach orientation, evidenced by high scores on measures of the Behavioral Activation System and low scores on the Behavioral Inhibition System, yet individuals high in dispositional authentic pride vigorously engage in their life goals and are able to put failures in perspective, whereas those high in dispositional hubristic pride tend to set unrealistic goals for fame and success, and self-servingly interpret any positive event as indicative of their own greatness (Carver, Sinclair, & Johnson, 2010).

Shame and Guilt. When former Senator Bob Kerrey publicly acknowledged that he had ordered soldiers to murder innocent civilians during the Vietnam War, he told a reporter, “It’s far more than guilt. It’s the shame. You can never, can never get away from it. It darkens your day” (Vistica, 2001). Kerrey chose his words carefully, emphasizing a distinction between two seemingly similar self-conscious emotions. Despite the traditional view that guilt and shame “are one and the same affect” (Tomkins, 1963, p. 133), a large body of research is more consistent
Shame is an acutely painful emotion that is typically accompanied by a sense of smallness, worthlessness, and powerlessness. Shamed people tend to feel exposed, and want to hide or escape in response. Guilt, in contrast, tends to be a less painful experience, largely because the object of condemnation is a specific behavior the individual committed, rather than his or her entire self-concept. Guilt is typically accompanied by feelings of tension, remorse, and regret, which can preoccupy the individual and motivate reparation or apology (Tangney & Tracy, 2012).

Supporting this distinction, guilt has been linked to numerous pro-social reparative behaviors whereas shame has been linked to hiding and social withdrawal, as well as a range of more problematic psychological and social consequences (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Randles & Tracy, 2013; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Yet there are few antecedent events that uniquely elicit either shame or guilt (Keltner & Buswell, 1996), suggesting that it is not the event, *per se*, that determines which emotion is experienced, but rather how that event is appraised. Individuals tend to experience guilt when they focus on negative aspects of their behavior—the “*thing* done or undone”—but shame when they focus on negative aspects of themselves—the *self* who did or did not do it (H. B. Lewis, 1971, p. 30; M. Lewis, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). For example, individuals who blame poor performance on ability (e.g., “I’m dumb”) tend to respond with shame, whereas those who blame effort (e.g., “I didn’t study for the exam”) tend to respond with guilt (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Russell & McAuley, 1986; Tracy & Robins, 2006).

Together, these studies suggest that guilt may be an adaptive response to failures or transgressions that could be avoided in the future; experiencing an emotion that motivates apology and reparation is a functional way to cope with unstable or controllable negative events. In contrast, shame may be an equally adaptive response to failures that cannot be prevented; in
such cases, withdrawal and avoidance may be the best approach. Consistent with this account, proneness to guilt is linked to pro-social tendencies such as empathy and perspective taking, whereas shame focuses individuals’ attention inward, preventing empathy or care for others (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010). Shame-prone individuals instead demonstrate bouts of anger and aggression; although these outward-directed emotions seem antithetical to shame’s self-blaming focus, individuals may regulate painful shame feelings by externalizing blame and directing their negative self-oriented feelings outwards (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2004a; 2006).

However, several researchers have raised questions about this fairly straightforward view of shame as bad and guilt as good. These authors note that many studies demonstrating this pattern of effects rely on measures that operationally define shame in terms of withdrawal and maladaptive coping, and guilt in terms of proactive coping (e.g., the Test of Self-Conscious Affect [TOSCA]; Tagney & Dearing, 2002). The TOSCA further isolates the maladaptive side of shame and adaptive side of guilt by examining partial correlations between shame or guilt and dependent measures while controlling for the other emotion (e.g., examining a partial correlation between shame and aggression while controlling for guilt), a tactic that captures guilt-free-shame and shame-free guilt but precludes the possibility of finding that both shame and guilt—and, importantly, the shared variance between the two—might have both adaptive and maladaptive outcomes. In contrast, several studies using measures other than the TOSCA have observed positive effects of both emotions; for example, when assessed as single adjective items, both emotions have been associated with a desire to make amends and change the self (e.g., Leach & Cidam, 2015; Lickel, Kushlev, Savalei, Matta, & Schmader, 2014; Tignor & Colvin, 2017).

Taken together, these studies suggest that the correlates of shame and guilt largely depend on how these emotions are measured. Both the TOSCA and single-item approaches have
limitations, and one important future direction is to develop measures that: (a) capture behavioral
tendencies, cognitions, and feelings without relying on the often-confused single words, (b) allow
for the possibility of shared variance between the two emotions, and (c) avoid inherently
embedding pro-social and anti-social content into the measure itself, thus conflating presumed
definitions of these emotions with their outcomes. One potentially promising measure is the
scenario-based Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) scale, which include separate subscales
capturing the tendency toward negative self-evaluations, negative behavior-evaluations, repair
action tendencies, and withdrawal action tendencies (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011).
Although these researchers labeled the negative behavior-evaluation and repair action tendencies
scale as “guilt,” and the negative self-evaluation and withdrawal action tendencies scale as
“shame”, their primary aim was to allow for tests of independent effects of each of these
components; future iterations might consider removing the “shame” and “guilt” labels altogether.
For a more detailed discussion and review of available measures of shame and guilt, as well as
other self-conscious emotions, see Robins, Noftle, and Tracy (2007).

Embarrassment. Embarrassment is typically considered a less intense or prolonged
emotional experience than shame or guilt; it is also less likely to occur in response to moral
wrongdoings or transgressions that harm others, compared to generally harmless mishaps that
expose the individual (Tangney, Miller, et al., 1996). In fact, embarrassment’s most defining
characteristic is that it involves public exposure or negative evaluations by others (Miller &
Leary, 1992; Semin & Manstead, 1981). Miller (1996) found that the most common causes of
embarrassment were situations in which the individual behaved in a clumsy or hapless way while
others were watching. More sociologically oriented theorists subscribe to a “dramaturgic”
account, in which embarrassment is the result of a social role or social script disruption
(Goffman, 1956; Silver, Sabini, & Parrott, 1987). In all these cases, embarrassment seems to be
functional by virtue of motivating individuals to behave in appeasing or conciliatory ways that might re-earn approval and inclusion (Cupach & Metts, 1992; Leary, Landel, & Patton, 1996). Personality studies have found individual differences in proneness to embarrassment (Modigliani, 1968); those high in this dimension tend be high in neuroticism, negative affect, self-consciousness, fear of negative evaluations, and shyness (Edelmann & McCusker, 1986; Leary & Meadows, 1991; Miller, 1995), which may be the result of high sensitivity to social norms (Miller, 1996). Personality differences can also affect the onset of embarrassment; one study found that shy individuals showed heightened physiological responses indicative of embarrassment (i.e., blushing) following an embarrassing situation (Hofmann, Moscovitch, & Kim, 2006).

**Are Self-Conscious Emotions Evolved?**

Most theoretical accounts of self-conscious emotions view these states as evolved responses to the environment, which function to send important messages about one’s social worth and status to the individual experiencing the emotion and to others, typically through a distinct nonverbal display (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tracy, 2016; Tracy & Robins, 2004a. Indeed, one of the most prominent gold-standard criteria used to determine whether a particular emotion is likely to be evolved is whether it has a distinct, cross-culturally recognized nonverbal expression. Although pride and shame were not included in the pantheon of emotions originally thought to meet this criterion, in recent years evidence has emerged for cross-cultural, reliably recognized expressions of both. The prototypical pride expression includes the body (i.e., expanded posture, head tilted slightly back, arms akimbo with hands on hips or raised above the head with hands in fists) as well as the face (i.e., small smile; Tracy & Robins, 2004b), and is reliably recognized and distinguished from similar emotions by individuals across cultures, including several highly isolated, largely preliterate, traditional small-scale societies (Tracy &
Robins, 2008; Tracy, Shariff, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013). In educated North American samples pride-recognition rates are comparable to rates found for most basic emotions (e.g., anger, sadness).

Importantly, the recognizable pride expression is also spontaneously displayed in pride-eliciting situations, by successful children as young as 3-years-old (Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1992; Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992), high school students who have performed well on a class exam (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982), and victorious adult Olympic athletes from countries all over the world, as well as congenitally blind athletes across cultures who could not have learned to display pride through visual modeling (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Together, these findings suggest that the pride expression is likely to be a human universal, and even an innate behavioral response to success. It is unlikely that the expression would: (a) be recognized so consistently and robustly, (b) by individuals who could not have learned it through cross-cultural transmission (e.g., films, magazines), or (c) be reliably and spontaneously displayed in pride-eliciting situations by individuals who have never seen others display it, if it were not a basic part of human nature.

Shame is also associated with a recognizable nonverbal expression, which consists of essentially the opposite set of behaviors as pride: head tilted downward and lowered eye gaze, along with slumped posture (Izard, 1971; Keltner, 1995; Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). The shame expression can be reliably distinguished from similar emotions such as embarrassment and sadness (Keltner, 1995). Shame-recognition rates in North American samples are typically lower than those observed for pride, but not substantially lower than rates often found for certain basic emotions, such as fear (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Keltner, 1995; Tracy et al., 2009).

Shame recognition rates are considerably lower in non-Western cultures (e.g., Chung & Robins, 2015, PlosOne), but significantly-greater-than-chance recognition was observed in the
same two traditional small-scale societies where pride recognition was examined, providing evidence for universality (Tracy & Robins, 2008; Tracy et al., 2013). In addition, the recognizable shame expression is spontaneously displayed in the shame-eliciting situation of failure. Head tilt downward and slumped posture or narrowed shoulders have been documented in response to failure or loss of a fight in children as young as 2.5-3 years old (Lewis et al., 1992; Stipek et al., 1992), older children aged 3-10 (Strayer & Strayer, 1976), high-school students (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982), and adult Olympic athletes from a wide range of countries (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Interestingly, these athletes reliably narrowed their chests and slumped their shoulders in response to defeat only if they were from countries outside of North America and Western Europe. This cultural difference—an absence of failure-based shame displays by individuals from the most individualistic and self-expression-valuing Western nations—is consistent with the strong devaluation of shame in these cultures (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). The finding that congenitally blind athletes across cultures, including several from Western nations, did reliably display shame in response to loss in this research suggests that the observed cultural difference in sighted athletes is likely to be a result of display suppression—sighted individuals from cultures where shame is devalued inhibiting the expression in accordance with local cultural norms (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008).

Studies have failed to find a distinct nonverbal expression for guilt (Haidt & Keltner, 1999), which may mean that shame is the evolved negative self-conscious emotion and guilt is a highly cognized version that exists in many but not all cultures. Alternatively, guilt might be an evolved emotion that is simply not associated with a distinct nonverbal expression. In contrast, embarrassment is associated with a distinct nonverbal display, which includes head tilted down and to the side, a controlled smile, and movement of the hand to touch the face (Keltner, 1995). In North American samples this display is recognized at rates comparable to—and often better
than—those found for shame (Tracy et al., 2009). Keltner (1995) uncovered this display by coding videos of participants experimentally manipulated to feel embarrassed, suggesting that the recognizable display is in fact shown during experiences of the emotion.

Few studies have tested whether the embarrassment expression generalizes across cultures, but Haidt and Keltner (1999) found that villagers in Orissa, a relatively underdeveloped Indian state, identified the embarrassment display as *lajya*, a term that conveys both shame and embarrassment. Individuals in this sample also described the situations that elicit *lajya* in similar terms as Americans use for embarrassment, such as self-exposure, being praised in front of others. Although they used the same word to refer to shame situations (“doing something wrong”), they made a distinction between the *lajya* you feel in one situation versus the other. These results suggest that the distinction between embarrassment and shame may generalize across cultures that do not have distinct words for the two emotions—in much the same way as Americans use the word *pride* to refer to both hubristic and authentic pride. Together, the accumulated evidence suggests that pride, shame, and possibly embarrassment are associated with nonverbal displays that may be universal, consistent with evolutionary accounts of these emotions.

**The Adaptive Functions of Self-Conscious Emotions**

A growing body of research suggests that pride functions to motivate status-seeking efforts and help individuals communicate their increased deservedness of status to others (Tracy et al., 2010). Pride arises in response to achievements that are likely to promote high status (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008; Weidman, Tracy, & Elliot, 2016), individuals intuitively assume that people who feel pride hold high status (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), and individuals induced to feel pride tend to engage in high-status behaviors and be perceived by others as dominant (Williams & DeSteno, 2009). In addition, pride experiences and the desire to attain these
experiences motivate achievement, perseverance, and positive behavioral change in status-relevant domains (Verbeke, Belschak, & Bagozzi, 2004; Williams & DeSteno, 2008; Weidman et al., 2016). Consequent achievements are in turn rewarded with social approval and high status.

It thus seems self-evident that pride functions to promote status, but this conclusion is complicated by the strong evidence that pride is not a singular experience. Although authentic pride is linked to achievement, hubristic pride tends to be a weaker response to success (Tracy & Robins, 2007; Weidman et al., 2016). Furthermore, given the notably negative personality correlates of hubristic pride, it is not immediately obvious how this form of the emotion might be adaptive. However, there is evidence to suggest that both facets ultimately promote increased social influence, but via different avenues. Whereas authentic pride may be ideally suited to promoting a prestige-based status, hubristic pride may be functional by promoting dominance.

This distinction comes from Henrich and Gil-White (2001), who differentiated between individuals who attain social rank by inducing fear, typically through intimidation and coercion (dominance); and individuals who attain rank by demonstrating skills or expertise and earning respect and willing deference on this basis (prestige). Empirical studies suggest that both dominance and prestige are effective means of increasing one’s status; individuals who wield both strategies acquire influence over their group (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). Hubristic and authentic pride may therefore have separately evolved as the affective mechanisms that, respectively, underpin each of these systems (Cheng et al., 2010; Tracy et al., 2010). More specifically, hubristic pride may facilitate the attainment of dominance by motivating individuals to behave in an aggressive and intimidating manner, and providing a sense of grandiosity and entitlement that allows them to take power rather than earn it, and to feel little empathy for those who get in the way (Ashton-James & Tracy, 2012; Tracy et al., 2009).
In contrast, authentic pride may facilitate the attainment of prestige by motivating creativity, accomplishments, and other indicators of competence, and providing individuals with feelings of genuine self-confidence that allow them to comfortably demonstrate both social attractiveness and generosity (Cheng et al., 2010; Damian & Robins, 2013; Weidman et al., 2016). Furthermore, to retain subordinates’ respect prestigious individuals must avoid succumbing to feelings of power and superiority, and authentic pride may allow these individuals to acknowledge their own achievements while maintaining humility and helping others (Ashton-James & Tracy, 2012; Tracy et al., 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Weidman et al., in press). Several studies provide more direct evidence for these theorized associations (Cheng et al., 2010). Individuals prone to authentic pride were found to rate themselves as highly prestigious, whereas those prone to hubristic pride rated themselves as more dominant. This pattern was replicated using peer ratings of dominance and prestige; varsity athletes high in dispositional authentic pride were viewed as prestigious (but not dominant) by their teammates, whereas those high in dispositional hubristic pride were viewed as dominant (but not prestigious).

The pride nonverbal expression also appears to serve an adaptive function; a large body of evidence suggests that pride displays send rapidly and automatically perceived messages of high status to other group members (Shariff & Tracy, 2009; Shariff, Tracy, & Markusoff, 2012). The status signalling property of these displays generalizes across cultures, including a small-scale traditional society on Fiji's outer islands (Tracy et al., 2013), suggesting that the expression may be an evolved status signal. Furthermore, given how widely and reliably recognized the pride expression is, perceiving pride in others may have adaptive benefits for observers as well as expressers (Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012). Studies supporting this account found that observers use others’ pride displays to determine which group members are likely to possess knowledge or expertise that should be copied (Martens & Tracy, 2013).
Turning to shame, its functionality may be akin to that of physical pain, which is aversive but adaptive by virtue of promoting injury avoidance. Shame experiences may have evolved as a kind of alarm system, warning individuals that a drop in social rank is imminent, and they should change their behaviour or depart from the situation to avoid the consequences. Consistent with this argument, shame responses to social transgressions have been documented among members of a small-scale traditional fishing village, suggesting that the propensity to feel shame in response to a deviation from culturally normative behavior may be a human universal (Fessler, 2004). Another supportive study found that individuals contribute more generously to a public good if they are threatened with being shamed for selfish behavior (Jacquet, Hauert, Traulsen, & Milinski, 2011).

Shame may also be adaptive by virtue of motivating individuals to engage in appeasement behaviors that demonstrate their increased trustworthiness or conformity to group norms, thereby reducing the likelihood of punishment in response to transgressions (Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1998). One study testing this account asked participants to read hypothetical scenarios about a CEO who apologised for a negative ecological incident caused by his company. Participants who learned that the CEO verbally expressed feelings of shame while apologising were more satisfied than those who learned that he communicated guilt or no emotion (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2008). Similarly, individuals apply weaker penalties to fictitious sex offenders who are described as feeling ashamed than to offenders described as feeling sad and remorseful, or no emotion (Proeve & Howells, 2006). Correspondingly, although the shame nonverbal display is automatically perceived as low status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009), a communication that is likely to reduce the expresser’s fitness, showing the display in response to a transgression may benefit expressers by appeasing onlookers (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Indeed, the shame expression may have evolved as a social signal that functions to inform group
members of: (a) a transgressing individual’s awareness that social norms have been violated, and
(b) his or her respect for those norms (Gilbert, 1998). Supporting this account, Keltner, Young, and Buswell (1997) found that participants were more sympathetic toward hypothetical students who failed a class presentation, and more forgiving of hypothetical criminals, when those individuals were said to display shame.

Although studies highlighting shame’s more problematic social consequences (e.g., anger, aggression, social avoidance) raise questions for this account of shame as adaptive, in many cases these negative behaviors result from a tendency, among individuals from Western cultures in particular, to try to avoid or otherwise regulate experiences of shame, often by externalizing blame (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2004a). It is therefore possible that shame experiences and nonverbal expressions are evolutionarily adaptive but humans’ desire to counteract, suppress, and avoid the emotion is problematic.

In contrast to shame, guilt is more clearly functional, as it motivates individuals to engage in pro-social, reparative behaviors following transgressions, and to take responsibility for their actions, all of which can enhance interpersonal relationships (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In a personality context, these functional responses are consistent with behaviors typical of highly conscientious individuals, who tend to obey social norms and demonstrate responsibility and accountability toward others (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005). In fact, studies have found that conscientious people tend to be high in proneness to guilt—a dimension associated with adaptive responding to transgressions (Fayard, Roberts, Robins, & Watson, 2012)—yet low in proneness to shame, the much more maladaptive propensity (e.g., Fee & Tangney, 2002).

**Development of Self-Conscious Emotions**
Self-conscious emotions are first experienced later in the course of development than more basic emotions: typically around 2 and a half to 3 years of age for pride and shame (Lewis et al., 1992; Stipek et al., 1992). These findings are based on studies that present young children with a challenging task and compare their behavioral and verbal responses after successful completion versus failure. Behavioral components of the pride expression and verbal indicators of pride tend to be shown by children at 2.5-3 years but not earlier, and not in shame-inducing (i.e., failure) situations. Correspondingly, by age 3 children tend to respond to failure situations by showing shame behaviors like tilting down their heads or covering their face with their hands (Belsky, Domitrovich, & Crnic, 1997).

In contrast, embarrassment has been identified in children somewhat earlier—at age two and below—and to be correlated with mirror self-recognition (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). On the basis of this finding, these authors argued that embarrassment emerges prior to shame and pride, perhaps because it requires only an ability to be self-aware (and no subsequent attributions or appraisals), and therefore belongs within a cognitively simpler class of self-conscious emotions. Similarly, Izard and colleagues (2001) included shame, guilt, and pride but not embarrassment within the category of cognition-dependent self-conscious emotions.

The capacity to understand pride emerges somewhat later than its (assumed) experience. The earliest-emerging form of understanding is the ability to recognize the pride nonverbal expression, which first appears when children reach age 4 (Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta, 2005)—the same age at which they begin to show accurate recognition of most other expressions. In contrast, the ability to understand the situations and contexts in which pride is elicited seems to develop considerably later. Seven-year olds have difficulty understanding that pride should be attributed to individuals whose success is due to internal but not external factors (Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987). However, by 9 or 10 children can make the appropriate
attributional distinctions, and grant pride only to individuals who are the cause of their own success (Kornilaki & Chloverakis, 2004). Although research into the development of children’s understanding of other self-conscious emotions has been scarce, the period from ages 4 to 8 seems to be critical; one study found that 7-8 year-olds could independently predict when another individual would feel embarrassment based on that person’s past experience, whereas 6-7 year-olds needed substantial prompting to make this connection, and 4-5-year olds could not make it at all (Chobhthaigh & Wilson, 2015).

Using a cross-sectional approach with a very large sample, Orth, Robins, and Soto (2010) delineated a portrait of normative developmental shifts in trait levels of shame, guilt, and authentic and hubristic pride across the lifespan. Authentic pride increased fairly continuously from adolescence to old age, in a trend that paralleled overall well-being. In contrast, hubristic pride peaked in adolescence and young adulthood, declined throughout the rest of adulthood until about age 65, and was stable in old age. Guilt and shame also showed somewhat opposing patterns; guilt increased steadily from adolescence through age 70, before hitting a plateau, whereas shame showed a steady decrease from adolescence through age 50, followed by a steady increase of equal magnitude through old age. These findings suggest that self-conscious emotional development generally follows the maturity principle of personality development (e.g., Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008), wherein maturing social roles facilitate the experience and expression of socially and intrapsychically adaptive emotions and traits. However, longitudinal studies are needed to ensure that the observed age differences in self-conscious emotions are not due to cohort differences.

**Biological Correlates and Consequences for Health**

Evolutionary accounts suggest that distinct emotions orchestrate coordinated suites of biological and physiological responses to environmentally significant events that have recurred
throughout human history (e.g., Beall & Tracy, in press). Given evidence for evolutionary origins of both pride and shame, these two emotions are likely to be associated with biological and physiological reactions that facilitate their respective adaptive goals. In fact, several studies have documented associations between shame and increases in cortisol and proinflammatory cytokines (Dickerson, Mycek, & Zaldivar, 2008; Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004), which might facilitate behaviors such as submission and withdrawal (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2009). Pride, in contrast, may be associated with hormonal responses like increased testosterone, which could facilitate gaining social rank (see Tracy et al., 2010). However, research on the biological correlates of these emotions is in its infancy, and much more work is needed to test whether shame and pride—along with guilt and embarrassment—are associated with distinct physiological or neurological markers, and how these responses might relate to status-seeking, appeasement, and deference behaviors.

Numerous studies have, however, examined the impact of shame and guilt on mental health. Perhaps not surprisingly given the clear distinction between these two emotions in pro-social versus anti-social outcomes, they show highly divergent relations with various psychological disorders and symptoms. Those who are prone to shame are also prone to depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, suicidal behavior and self-injury, and substance abuse (see Tangney & Tracy, 2012, for a review). In fact, clinicians have long argued that feelings of shame lie at the core of numerous addictions, especially alcoholism (e.g., Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005). Alcohol consumption can provide a means of escaping painful feelings of shame by reducing self-awareness, so alcoholics may drink to avoid shame, and then, in a vicious cycle, come to feel even more shame about their addiction. Supporting this account, one longitudinal study found that the degree to which recovering alcoholics displayed expressions of shame while discussing their past drinking substantially predicted subsequent declines in their physical and
mental health, as well as their likelihood of relapsing and the severity of that relapse, up to 4 months later (Randles & Tracy, 2013).

Turning to guilt, less consensus exists regarding its implications for psychopathology. Clinical theory and case studies make frequent reference to a maladaptive guilt characterized by chronic self-blame and rumination (e.g., Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, Krupnick, & McKnew, 1990), but these views are inconsistent with the large body of work suggesting that guilt motivates pro-social approach-oriented behaviors. Tangney and Dearing (2002) have reconciled these accounts by arguing that studies demonstrating negative outcomes generally failed to control for shared variance with shame, and it is the latter emotion that is the cause of psychological dysfunction. For example, a meta-analysis found that shame was more strongly and consistently associated with depression than was guilt (mean weighted effect size $r_s = .43$ and $.28$, respectively), and guilt controlling for shame (i.e., “shame-free guilt”) was unrelated to depression ($r = -.03$; Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011).

Only one study has examined correlations between dispositional tendencies toward the two facets of pride and psychopathology; results suggest a generally healthy portrait for those prone to authentic pride, and a much less healthy one for those prone to hubristic pride. Most notably, authentic pride is negatively, and hubristic pride positively, associated with narcissistic personality disorder, dissociative tendencies, social phobia, and trait anxiety (Tracy et al., 2009). Additional studies are needed to examine the extent to which the different forms of pride are causally related to these divergent mental health profiles.

**Other Social Emotions**

In the past two decades emotion and personality researchers have begun to examine a wider range of social emotions, beyond the self-conscious emotions that previously pervaded the non-basic emotion research literature. One unifying theme is that these other emotions are almost
always inherently social, arising on the basis of actual or potential interactions among people, or in response to a social comparison. This is an important distinction from self-conscious emotions, which can (and often do) occur in response to social events, but are more intrinsically about the self, and can occur when individuals evaluate themselves without regard to others. These other social emotions are nonetheless similar to self-conscious emotions in that most are thought to serve adaptive functions, though evidence for their evolutionary origins is generally much weaker than for pride and shame. Here, we provide a brief overview of extant research on six social emotions, with an emphasis on findings from or relevant to personality psychology.

**Gratitude.** Gratitude arises when an individual believes that he or she has benefitted from another person’s action, and can motivate individuals to engage in tedious tasks that are helpful to a benefactor, and to donate more of their personal profit to a communal pot (e.g., Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). Gratitude also prompts altruistic behaviors toward one’s romantic partner, which in turn helps bind the two individuals together, thereby enhancing relationship quality (e.g., Algoe, 2012). At a dispositional level, trait gratitude is positively linked to life satisfaction, optimism, and positive affect (McCullough et al., 2002), and negatively to a range of psychopathologies, including depression, anxiety disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Wood, Froh, & Geraghty, 2010).

The beneficial effects of the emotion may be particularly pronounced for older adults, who tend to experience greater gratitude as a result of viewing their remaining time as limited (Allemand & Hill, 2016). However, other studies suggest that a grateful disposition can be cultivated by anyone, and interventions designed to boost dispositional gratitude have shown promise for increasing health and well-being. In a seminal study, Emmons and McCullough (2003) found that individuals assigned to a gratitude intervention scored higher on several self- and spouse-reported measures of well-being and mental health, compared to individuals in a
control condition that required listing daily hassles. Subsequent interventions have also proven effective, but these studies often fail to employ rigorous double-blind designs with true neutral control groups, making this an important area for future work (Wood et al., 2010).

**Compassion.** Compassion arises in response to witnessing someone suffering or in need, and motivates a desire to help that individual (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Lim & DeSteno, 2016). It is a broad emotional experience that encompasses narrower feelings of empathic concern, sympathy, and tenderness, each of which are often conceptualized and measured in a similar manner (e.g., Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy, Karbon, Maszk, Smith, O’Boyle, & Suh, 1994). Compassion also increases one’s sense of connection and identification with others, particularly others who are relatively weak or vulnerable (Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). At a physiological level, compassion has been shown to increase cardiac vagal tone activity, a marker of the parasympathetic nervous system that is known to promote affiliative behaviors (Stellar, Cohen, Oveis, & Keltner, 2015).

Based on these findings, some have argued that the primary adaptive function of compassion is to promote care for needy offspring, thereby enhancing inclusive fitness (Goetz et al., 2010). In fact, Buckels and colleagues (2015) found that individual differences in parental motivation were positively related to momentary feelings of compassion when imagining caregiving for infants and children.¹

**Jealousy.** Jealousy involves a concern about losing something valuable, particularly to a rival and within the context of a romantic relationship. It is a complex emotional experience that includes feelings of sadness, suspicion, betrayal, threat, and vengeance (Parrott & Smith, 1993). Jealousy has been conceptualized as a psychological adaptation which functions to signal that

¹ Although Buckles and colleagues (2015) labeled this emotion “tenderness,” it was defined in the same manner as previous conceptualizations of compassion, and was measured with the word *compassion.*
one’s relationship is in danger and to motivate behaviors that guard against this threat and reduce unnecessary or inefficient expenditures of mating or parenting resources (Buss & Haselton, 2005). Evolutionary logic further posits that men must contend with paternity uncertainty, making a partner’s sexual infidelity a risk factor for wasted parenting resources, whereas women rely on their partners’ investment of resources and childcare, making emotional infidelity a larger risk factor. Supporting this account, studies across cultures have demonstrated that men report greater jealousy, and show increased physiological reactivity, to thoughts of sexual infidelity than emotional infidelity, and women show the opposite (see Buss & Haselton, 2005, for a review).

This theory has, however, attracted criticism from multiple angles. For example, some have noted that supportive studies rely exclusively on forced-choice measures that require participants to choose which form of infidelity (sexual or emotional) would upset them more; when continuous measures are used and a wider range of feelings linked to jealousy assessed, both men and women report greater jealousy at the thought of sexual than emotional infidelity (DeSteno, Bartlett, Braverman, & Salovey, 2002). In addition, others have argued and found that men show elevated physiological arousal when thinking about sexual material, regardless of whether it is about a partner’s infidelity, compared to when thinking about emotional content; this difference is less consistent in women (Harris, 2000). Together, these findings support the notion that jealousy may be a universal emotional state arising from the cognitive appraisal that a rival is threatening a valued aspect of one’s relationship, and sexual infidelity may represent a more severe threat than emotional infidelity across genders.

Envy. Whereas jealousy arises primarily in relationship contexts, envy is a broader feeling that can arise with any upward social comparison that results in an individual’s belief that he or she is lacking a desired personal attribute compared to the superior individual (Parrott & Smith, 1993). An early influential definition of dispositional envy emphasized feelings of
inadequacy, injustice, and frustration, along with resentment toward the superior person; individuals who reported high dispositional envy tended to be low in self-esteem and life satisfaction, and high in neuroticism (Smith, Parrot, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999). In recent years, researchers have embraced a more nuanced formulation, in which the construct consists of two distinct emotional experiences, both elicited by upward social comparisons (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). First, benign envy involves positive feelings of admiration toward a superior individual and a desire to affiliate with this person, as well as the motivation to improve one’s own standing on the desired attribute. In contrast, malicious envy involves feelings of frustration and injustice regarding one’s inferiority, as well as a desire to harm, degrade, or otherwise impede the superior individual in the hope that he or she will lose the desired attribute or status.

Both benign and malicious envy may function to help individuals recoup a sense of relative status. Consistent with the notion that benign envy is linked to behaviors oriented toward improving one’s own status relative to others whereas malicious envy is linked to bringing others down to one’s own level, adults training for a marathon showed improved race performance to the extent that they felt benign envy, and this relation was mediated by a tendency to set challenging race goals; in contrast, malicious envy was not related to performance (Lange & Crusius, 2015a). In another set of studies, individuals who witnessed another person’s achievement felt benign envy if the other person conveyed authentic pride (indicating a hard-earned and status boosting success), but malicious envy if the other person conveyed hubristic pride (indicating false bravado and arrogance). These distinct feelings were in turn functional; after losing to the proud individual in one round of a cognitive competition, participants who felt benign envy persisted more in a subsequent round, whereas those who felt malicious envy assigned their competitor more difficult problems (Lange & Crusius, 2015b).
**Humility.** Of all the social emotions, humility holds perhaps the most clear-cut place in personality psychology, because it has typically been conceptualized as a disposition, virtue, or character strength (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Much like envy, existing models suggest that humility arises from an evaluation of one’s own standing on a desirable personal attribute; yet, unlike envy—which includes a judgmental focus on a personal weakness—humility involves accurate but non-judgmental perceptions of either positive or negative personal attributes, as well as an awareness or appreciation of desirable attributes in other individuals (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky, 2013). Consistent with this emphasis on accurate self-knowledge, Davis and colleagues (2011) conceptualized humility as a judgment made about others who possess an accurate view of their own abilities and a lack of any desire to self-enhance; these two traits in turn positively predicted judgments of an individual’s standing on the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO model of personality.

A more recent model has, however, added an important layer of nuance to this overtly positive and socially desirable conceptualization. Drawing on historical accounts from philosophical and religious texts, as well as etymological and dictionary definitions, we found, across a series of correlational and experimental studies, that both momentary and dispositional experiences of humility are characterized by two distinct factors, one representing “appreciative humility” and characterized by feelings such as kind, graceful, connected, and understanding, and the other representing “self-abasing humility” and characterized by feelings such as unimportant, shameful, worthless, and meek (Weidman, Cheng, & Tracy, in press). Appreciative humility—which mirrors previous positive conceptualizations—tends to follow personal successes and involve action tendencies oriented toward celebrating others, and is linked to emotional and personality dispositions that underlie achievement, such as authentic pride and prestige-based status. In contrast, self-abasing humility more often follows personal failures and
involves negative self-evaluative cognitions and action tendencies oriented toward hiding from others’ evaluations, and is linked to dispositions that underlie failure and withdrawal, such as low self-esteem and submissiveness. These two dimensions also emerged in conceptualizations of humility made by academic experts (i.e., editors of top-ranked philosophy and theology journals).

One important future direction is to further elucidate the functional consequences of both sides of this complex social emotion. Based the known correlates, appreciative humility may help individuals attain prestige, by demonstrating that despite their competence, they are prosocial group members who deserve admiration rather than envy. In contrast, self-abasing humility may function to signal one’s awareness of a failure or decline in status; one important question is therefore the extent to which this side of humility is distinct from shame.

Conclusion

The self-conscious and social emotions are central to personality functioning; they guide and shape many everyday social behaviors, interactions, and relationships. There is also evidence to suggest that these emotions serve important social functions, and, at least in several cases, that they evolved in humans to do so. The evolutionary evidence is much stronger for pride and shame compared to the other social emotions, but this may well be a result of the relatively greater research attention that self-conscious emotions have received. One important future direction is therefore continued research attention to the other social emotions; studies are needed to examine these emotions in the same way that self-conscious emotions have been studied: in terms of their possible nonverbal displays, cross-cultural generalizability, lifespan development, and physiological correlates and impact on health. Nonetheless, as this is the first edition of the *Handbook of Personality* to include a chapter on self-conscious and social emotions, it is clear that great strides have been made, and we hope this review helps direct the next steps in these endeavors.
References


