

## CHAPTER 21

# Self-Conscious Emotions

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All human emotions are, in a loose sense, "self-relevant." Emotions arise when something self-relevant happens or is about to happen. In the language of appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1966), we experience emotions when we judge that events have positive or negative significance for our well-being. The specific type of emotional response is shaped by both primary appraisals (e.g., of events' positive vs. negative implications for the individual), and secondary appraisals (e.g., of one's ability to cope with the events). But all emotions arise from events that in some way have relevance for oneself. There is, however, a special class of human emotions that is even more immediately self-relevant. This chapter focuses on these "self-conscious" emotions, which directly involve self-reflection and self-evaluation.

### Overview of Self-Conscious Emotions

Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride are members of a family of "self-conscious emotions" that are evoked by self-reflection and self-evaluation. This self-evaluation may be implicit or explicit, consciously experienced or transpiring beyond our awareness. But in

one way or another, these emotions fundamentally involve people's reactions to their own characteristics or behavior. For example, when good things happen, we may feel a range of positive emotions—joy, happiness, satisfaction or contentment. But we feel pride in our *own* positive attributes or actions. By the same token, when bad things happen, many negative emotions are possible—for example, sadness, disappointment, frustration, or anger. But feelings of shame and guilt typically arise from the recognition of one's *own* negative attributes or behaviors. Even when we feel shame due to another person's behavior, that person is almost invariably someone with whom we are closely affiliated or identified (e.g., a family member, friend, or colleague closely associated with oneself). We experience shame because that person is part of our self-definition.

One way to understand the distinction between self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions is to think about how every emotion is uniquely influenced, and in some cases dramatically shifted, by the involvement of self-processes, such as self-reflection and self-evaluation. These processes convert what would otherwise be sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and joy into the more self-relevant emotions of shame, guilt, hostility,

### Self-Conscious Emotions

contempt, and pride can become transmute think about what our identity; this may be Roosevelt's famous saying we have to fear major impact on a generation who were at an age who are highly prominent. or aggression when someone who has threatened identity and made his (Bushman & Baume presidential quote, "to kick around anyone. Happiness becomes individuals credit themselves (Tracy & Robins, 200

As these example: emotions are a special critically involve selfings, intentions, and 1995; Fischer & Tang people to work hard task domains (Stipek and to behave in mature ways in their intimate relationships & Heatherton, 1999). As a result, are important to a relationship. Guilt is centrally involved in prosocial behaviors, moralism, and caregiving (Ter et al., 1994; Tang Shame punishes individuals felt when individuals violating) important motivates prosocial behavior (suba, 2007; Tracy, and is the emotion gives self-esteem (Tracy Marshall, 2001). emotions function salient feedback or acceptability—our view

The primary distinction self-conscious emotion requires the self-representations ("I") on those representations ("I"), and to put a self-evaluation. Complex self-evaluation an important part

ity, contempt, and pride. For example, fear can become transmuted into guilt when we think about what our fear means for our identity; this may be why Franklin Delano Roosevelt's famous statement, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself," had a major impact on a generation of individuals who were at an age when identity concerns are highly prominent. Anger becomes hostility or aggression when it is directed toward someone who has threatened an individual's identity and made him or her feel insecure (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Another presidential quote, "You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore" reflects this sentiment. Happiness becomes pride when individuals credit themselves for a positive event (Tracy & Robins, 2004).

As these examples imply, self-conscious emotions are a special class of emotions that *critically* involve self-relevant thoughts, feelings, intentions, and behaviors (Campos, 1995; Fischer & Tangney, 1995). They drive people to work hard in achievement and task domains (Stipek, 1995; Weiner, 1985), and to behave in moral, socially appropriate ways in their social interactions and intimate relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). As a result, self-conscious emotions are important to a range of social outcomes. Guilt is centrally involved in reparative and prosocial behaviors such as empathy, altruism, and caregiving (Batson, 1987; Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame punishes immoral behavior, as it is felt when individuals violate (or anticipate violating) important social standards. Pride motivates prosocial behaviors (Hart & Matsuba, 2007; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010) and is the emotion (along with shame) that gives self-esteem its affective kick (Brown & Marshall, 2001). Together, self-conscious emotions function to provide immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability—our worth as human beings.

The primary distinctive characteristic of self-conscious emotions is that their elicitation requires the ability to form stable self-representations ("me"), to focus attention on those representations (i.e., to self-reflect; "I"), and to put it all together to generate a self-evaluation (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Complex self-evaluative processes are both an important part of the direct causal pro-

cesses that elicit self-conscious emotions (i.e., a proximal cause) and of the evolutionary processes through which these emotions became part of the human repertoire (i.e., a distal cause). These self-processes may mediate the relation between an emotion-eliciting event or environmental stimulus and its emotional output (the self-conscious emotion).

## Shame and Guilt

To many, shame and guilt are the quintessential "moral emotions"—woven inextricably in our imagery of the repentant sinner. Shame and guilt are typically mentioned in the same breath, as moral emotions that inhibit antisocial, morally objectionable behavior. But an extensive theoretical and empirical literature underscores striking differences in the phenomenology of these emotions (Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1993; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Weiner, 1985; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983)—differences that have important and distinct implications for subsequent motivation and behavior. Most notably, a decade of research indicates that shame and guilt are not equally "moral" or adaptive emotions. Evidence suggests that whereas guilt consistently motivates people in a positive direction (Baumeister et al., 1994; Eisenberg, 1986; Tangney, 1991, 1995a, 1995b), shame is a moral emotion that can easily go awry (Tangney, 1991, 1995a, 1995b, 1996).

### What Is the Difference between Shame and Guilt?

Despite the general tendency among many to use the terms *shame* and *guilt* interchangeably, a large body of research suggests that these two emotions are in fact quite distinct. Two bases for distinguishing between shame and guilt stand out as especially influential—early anthropologists' focus on public versus private transgressions (e.g., Benedict, 1946), and Helen Block Lewis's (1971) focus on self versus behavior.

In distinguishing between shame and guilt, anthropologists focused on differences in the content or structure of events eliciting these emotions. The notion is that certain *kinds of situations* lead to shame, whereas other *kinds of situations* lead to guilt. More

specifically, shame was viewed as a more "public" emotion than guilt (Benedict, 1946), arising from public exposure and disapproval of some shortcoming or transgression. Guilt, on the other hand, was conceived as a more "private" experience arising from self-generated pangs of conscience. As it turns out, empirical research has failed to support this public-private distinction (Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner, 1994; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). For example, we conducted a systematic analysis of the social context of personal shame- and guilt-eliciting events, described by several hundred children and adults (Tangney et al., 1994). Results indicated that shame and guilt are equally likely to be experienced in the presence of others. "Solitary" shame experiences were about as common as "solitary" guilt experiences. Even more to the point, the frequency with which others were *aware* of the respondents' behavior did not vary as a function of shame and guilt, in direct contradiction to the anthropologists' conceptualization.

Might shame and guilt be distinguished by the types of transgressions or failures that elicit them? Analyses of personal shame and guilt experiences provided by children and adults revealed few, if any, "classic" shame- or guilt-inducing situations (Tangney, 1992; Tangney et al., 1994). Guilt has been more narrowly linked to moral transgressions (e.g., behaviors that cause harm, violate the rights of others, or adversely affect the well-being of the community), whereas shame can be elicited by a broader range of situations, including both "moral" and "nonmoral" failures (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Sabini & Silver, 1997; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Another series of studies found that shame is more likely to be elicited by proscriptive violations (doing behaviors we should not), whereas guilt is more likely to be elicited by prescriptive violations (not doing things we should; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), but most types of potentially negative self-relevant events (lying, cheating, stealing, failing to help another, disobeying parents, sex, etc.) are cited by some people in connection with feelings of shame and by others in connection with guilt. Consistent with the overall trend of these results, Keltner and Buswell (1996) and Tracy and Robins

(2006) both measured shame- and guilt-eliciting events and found a high degree of overlap in the types of events that cause the two emotions.

How, then, do shame and guilt differ, if not in the types of situations that elicit them? Empirical research has been much more supportive of Helen Block Lewis's (1971) emphasis on a distinction between blaming the self versus behavior. According to Lewis, shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self; guilt involves a negative evaluation of a specific behavior. Although this distinction may, at first glance, appear rather subtle, this differential emphasis on self ("I did that horrible thing") versus behavior ("I *did* that horrible thing") sets the stage for very different emotional experiences and very different patterns of motivations and subsequent behavior.

*Shame* is an acutely painful emotion that is typically accompanied by a sense of shrinking or "being small," and by a sense of worthlessness and powerlessness. Shamed people also feel exposed. Although shame does not necessarily involve an actual observing audience to witness one's shortcomings, there is often the imagery of how one's defective self would appear to others. Lewis (1971) described a split in self-functioning in which the self is both agent and object of observation and disapproval. An observing self witnesses and denigrates the observed self as unworthy and reprehensible. Not surprisingly, shame often leads to a desire to escape or to hide—to sink into the floor and disappear.

*Guilt*, in contrast, is typically a less painful, devastating experience because the object of condemnation is a specific behavior, not the person as a whole. One's core identity or self-concept is less at stake. Rather than feeling a need to defend a vulnerable self-image under attack, people experiencing guilt are focused on the offense and its consequences, feeling tension, remorse, and regret over the "bad thing done." People feeling guilt often report a nagging focus or preoccupation with the transgression—thinking of it over and over, wishing they had behaved differently or could somehow undo the harm that was done. Rather than motivating avoidance and defense, guilt motivates reparative behavior—confession, apology, and attempts to fix the situation.

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Lewis's (1971) distinction between shame and guilt has received broad empirical support, both in qualitative case studies and in quantitative ratings of shame and guilt experiences associated with situations (for reviews, see Tangney, Stuewig, & Robins, 2006).

### Shame and Guilt: "Moral" or Psychologically Adaptive Emotions?

One of the consistent findings in empirical research is that shame and guilt are not equally "adaptive" emotions. Shame appears to be the more "adaptive" emotion for the vast majority of individuals, in a variety of ways (Heatherton, 1994, 1995b). Five of the adaptive functions of shame and the hidden costs of

### Hiding versus Appearing

First, research shows that shame leads to contrasting tendencies (Breugelmans, 2001; Ketelaar & Au, 2001; Say-Hartz, 1984; 2010; Tangney, 1992; Wallbott & Scherer, 1983). In the face of shame, people typically hide, or escape the situation. In the face of guilt, people typically confess, apologize, or make amends. For example, when people experience shame, they rate personal shame as more distressing than guilt, and are more compelled to hide or escape than to confess or apologize. In contrast, when people experience guilt, they are more inclined to admit the wrongdoing and to apologize or make amends. Guilt motivates people to seek equity when resolving

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Lewis's (1971) self-versus-behavior distinction between shame and guilt has received broad empirical support from studies employing diverse methodologies including qualitative case studies, content analyses of shame and guilt narratives, participants' quantitative ratings of personal shame and guilt experiences, analyses of attributions associated with shame and guilt, and analyses of participants' counterfactual thinking (for reviews, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2006).

### **Shame and Guilt Are Not Equally "Moral" or Psychologically Adaptive Emotions**

One of the consistent themes emerging from empirical research is that shame and guilt are not equally "moral" or psychologically adaptive emotions. On balance, guilt appears to be the more useful emotion, benefiting individuals and their relationships in a variety of ways (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Tangney, 1991, 1995b). Five sets of findings illustrate the adaptive functions of guilt, in contrast to the hidden costs of shame.

#### **Hiding versus Amending**

First, research shows that shame and guilt lead to contrasting motivations or "action tendencies" (de Hooze, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ferguson et al., 1991; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, 1993; Tangney et al., 1996; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995; Wicker et al., 1983). In the face of failure or transgression, shame typically leads to attempts to deny, hide, or escape the shame-inducing situation; guilt typically leads to reparative action—confessing, apologizing, undoing. For example, when people anonymously describe and rate personal shame and guilt experiences along a number of phenomenological dimensions (Tangney, 1993; Tangney, Miller, et al., 1996), their ratings indicate that they feel more compelled to hide from others and less inclined to admit what they had done when feeling shame as opposed to guilt. Feelings of guilt motivate people to restore wealth-based equity when resources are distributed un-

evenly in their favor (Gino & Pierce, 2009). Even when unconsciously primed, guilt leads people to avoid overindulgence and to help less fortunate others, especially among those dispositionally prone to guilt (Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimmons, 2007). Taken together, findings across studies suggest that guilt motivates people in a constructive, proactive, future-oriented direction, whereas shame motivates people toward separation, distance, and defense.

#### **Other-Oriented Empathy**

Second, there appears to be a special link between guilt and empathy. Empathy is a highly valued, prosocial emotional process. Empathy motivates altruistic, helping behavior that fosters warm, close interpersonal relationships and inhibits antisocial behavior and interpersonal aggression (Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Feshbach, 1987; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969, 1982, 1986). Research also indicates that at both the state and trait level, guilt and empathy go hand in hand, whereas feelings of shame often interfere with an empathic connection (Joireman, 2004; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Silfver, Helkama, Lonnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2008; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1994). Across numerous independent studies of people of all ages, results are remarkably consistent: Guilt-prone individuals are generally empathic individuals. Prone to guilt consistently correlates with perspective-taking and empathic concern. In contrast, shame-proneness has been associated with an impaired capacity for other-oriented empathy and a propensity for problematic, "self-oriented" personal distress responses. Similarly, studies considering emotion states—feelings of shame and guilt in the moment—have shown that when people describe personal guilt experiences, they convey greater empathy for others involved in the situation, compared to their descriptions of personal shame experiences (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 1994). Moreover, when people are experimentally induced to feel shame, they exhibit less empathy and perspective taking than do non-shamed controls (Marschall, 1996; Yang, Yang, & Chiou, 2010).



blame has been consistently negatively correlated with guilt at both the state and trait levels (Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt proneness is unrelated to anger—that is, guilt-prone people are just as prone to anger as anyone else. But when angered, guilt-prone individuals are inclined to manage their anger constructively (e.g., nonhostile discussion, direct corrective action), and they are *disinclined* toward aggression (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2004; Lutwak, Panish, Ferrari, & Razzino, 2001; Paulhus et al., 2004; Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney, Wagner, et al., 1996; Wright et al., 2008) or related disruptive behaviors (Kochanska, Barry, Jimenez, Hollatz, & Woodard, 2009). Moreover, guilt-prone individuals report that their anger typically results in positive long-term consequences (Tangney, Wagner, et al., 1996).

### Psychological Symptoms

The research reviewed thus far suggests that guilt is, on balance, the more “moral” or adaptive emotion—at least when considering social behavior and interpersonal adjustment. But is there a trade-off vis-à-vis individual psychological adjustment? Does the tendency to experience guilt over one’s transgressions ultimately lead to anxiety and depression, or to decreases in self-esteem? Is shame perhaps less problematic for intrapersonal as opposed to interpersonal adjustment?

In fact, researchers consistently report a positive relationship between proneness to shame and a host of psychological symptoms, including depression, generalized anxiety and social anxiety, low self-esteem, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), eating disorder symptoms, Cluster C personality disorders, suicidal behavior and self-injurious behavior, and substance abuse (e.g., Allan, Gilbert, & Goss, 1994; Andrews et al., 2000; Ashby, Rice, & Martin, 2006; Brown, Linehan, Comtois, Murray, & Chapman, 2009; Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Feiring & Taska, 2005; Fergus, Valentiner, McGrath, & Jencius, 2010; Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999; Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Gupta, Rosenthal, Mancini, Cheavens, & Lynch, 2008; Harder, 1995; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart,

1992; Harper & Arias, 2004; Hoblitzelle, 1987; Luyten et al., 2002; Meehan et al., 1996; Mills, 2003; Murray, Waller, & Legg, 2000; Rüsche et al., 2007; Sanftner, Barlow, Marschall, & Tangney, 1995; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2010; Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005; Tangney, 1993; Tangney, Burgraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, et al., 1992; Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006; Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, Felton, & Ciesla, 2008; Troop, Allan, Serpell, & Treasure, 2008; Valentiner & Smith, 2008). This relationship appears to be robust across a range of measurement methods and across diverse age groups and populations. Moreover, Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejeuz, and Gunderson (2010) presented evidence that the link between shame and psychological maladjustment is context- and emotion-specific. In their experimental study, heightened affective reactivity and borderline personality disorder were specifically linked to shame (as opposed to anxiety, hostility, and irritability) and most evident in response to negative evaluation (as opposed to a stressful task).

In summary, shame is frequently part of the clinical picture when considering psychological maladjustment (Dearing & Tangney, 2011). People who frequently experience feelings of shame about themselves seem vulnerable to a range of psychological symptoms. Furthermore, nonverbal displays of shame while discussing their addiction predict several measures of poor physical and mental health among recovering alcoholics (Randles & Tracy, 2011).

There is less consensus regarding the implications of guilt for psychopathology. The traditional view is that guilt plays a significant role in psychological symptoms. Clinical theory and case studies make frequent reference to a maladaptive guilt characterized by chronic self-blame and obsessive rumination over one’s transgressions (e.g., Blatt, D’Afflitti, & Quinlin, 1976; Freud, 1909/1955, 1917/1957; Piers & Singer, 1953; Weiss, 1993; Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, Krupnick, & McKnew, 1990). In contrast, recent theory and research have emphasized the adaptive functions of guilt, particularly for interpersonal behavior (Baumeister et al., 1994, 1995a; Hoffman, 1982; Tangney, 1991, 1994, 1995b; Tangney et al., 2007).

Attempting to reconcile these perspectives, Tangney and colleagues (1995) argued

that once one makes the critical distinction between shame and guilt, there is no compelling reason to expect guilt over specific behaviors to be associated with poor psychological adjustment. Rather, guilt is most likely to be maladaptive when it becomes fused with shame. When a person begins with a guilt experience ("Oh, look at what a horrible *thing* I have *done*") but then magnifies and generalizes the event to the self ("... and aren't I a horrible *person*"), many of the advantages of guilt are lost. Not only is a person faced with tension and remorse over a specific behavior that needs to be fixed, but he or she is also saddled with feelings of contempt and disgust for being a bad, defective person. And it is the shame component of this sequence—not the guilt component—that poses the problem. Often, an objectionable behavior can be altered, the negative effects can be repaired, or at least one can offer a heartfelt apology. Even in cases where direct reparation or apology is not possible, one can resolve to do better in the future. In contrast, being defective as a person is much more difficult to transform or amend. Shame—and, in turn, shame-fused guilt—offers little opportunity for redemption. Thus, it is guilt *with an overlay of shame* that most likely leads to the interminable painful rumination and self-castigation so often described in the clinical literature.

The empirical results are quite consistent with this view. Studies employing adjective checklist-type (and other globally worded) measures of shame and guilt have found that both shame- and guilt-prone styles are associated with psychological symptoms (Harder, 1995; Harder et al., 1992; Harder & Lewis, 1987; Jones & Kugler, 1993; Meehan et al., 1996). On the other hand, when measures that are sensitive to Lewis's (1971) distinction (e.g., scenario-based methods, such as the Test of Self-Conscious Affect [TOSCA], assessing shame and guilt proneness with respect to specific situations) are used instead, the tendency to experience "shame-free" guilt is essentially unrelated to psychological and behavioral symptoms. Numerous independent studies converge: Guilt-prone children, adolescents, and adults are not at increased risk for depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, and so forth (Bybee, Zigler, Berliner, & Merisca, 1996; Cohen et al., 2011;

Dearing et al., 2005; Fergus et al., 2010; Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002; Quiles & Bybee, 1997; Rüsche et al., 2007; Tangney, 1994, 1999; Tangney et al., 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006; Tilghman-Osborne et al., 2008).

A recent meta-analysis of 108 studies examining the differential links of shame and guilt to depression (Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011) underscores these conclusions. Overall, shame was more strongly and consistently related to depression (mean weighted effect size  $r = .43$ ) than was guilt ( $r = .28$ ), and the propensity to experience "shame-free" guilt was unrelated to depression ( $r = -.03$ ). Moreover, studies using TOSCA-type "contextualized" measures of guilt showed no relation to depression ( $r = .06$ ), whereas guilt measured by global affective checklists devoid of situational context showed a strong link to depression ( $r = .42$ ), similar to shame. In all cases, findings generalized across age, sex, and ethnicity.

#### *Detering Transgression and Socially Undesirable Behavior*

Shame may be very painful; it may interfere with other-oriented empathy; it may render us vulnerable to anxiety and depression. But there is a widely held assumption that because shame is so painful, at least it motivates people to avoid "doing wrong," decreasing the likelihood of transgression and impropriety (Barrett, 1995; Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Kahan, 1997; Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). As it turns out virtually no direct evidence supports this presumed adaptive function of shame. To the contrary, research suggests that shame may even make things worse.

In a study of college undergraduates, Tibbetts (2003) found that criminal offending was negatively related to guilt proneness. Results involving shame proneness were mixed. An overall shame-proneness index, comprising three dispositional measures of shame, was unrelated to illegal behavior, raising questions about the presumed inhibitory function of shame. Similar results were obtained in two prospective studies examining the degree to which shame and guilt proneness predict criminal behavior

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in samples of adolescents. In one study, guilt-proneness assessed in the fifth grade negatively predicted arrests and convictions reported by the participant at age 18. In contrast, shame proneness predicted neither (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In another community sample of adolescents (Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005), proneness to "shame-free" guilt again emerged as a protective factor, negatively predicting delinquency assessed both by juvenile court records and by self-report; proneness to "guilt-free" shame did not.

A few studies have employed samples of juvenile or adult offenders. Robinson, Roberts, Strayer, and Koopman (2007) found little difference in proneness to moral emotions when comparing 64 incarcerated adolescent offenders with 60 high school students. However, the groups did not substantially differ in terms of antisocial behavior, and when combined, shame proneness was largely unrelated to self-reported antisocial attitudes and behavior, whereas guilt proneness was consistently negatively related to antisocial attitudes and behaviors. In a large German sample of incarcerated adolescents and young adults (Hosser, Windzio, & Greve, 2008), single-item shame ratings at the outset of incarceration predicted higher recidivism rates, whereas guilt ratings predicted lower recidivism. Among adult offenders (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001) shame was associated with psychopathy, especially secondary psychopathy, aggression, and other antisocial personality characteristics. In a large sample of adult jail inmates, Tangney, Stuewig, Mashek, and Hastings (2011) found that inmates' shame proneness was associated with psychological symptoms, alcohol and drug problems, low self control, and the tendency to eschew responsibility and blame others, paralleling results from community samples. In contrast, inmates' guilt proneness was positively associated with other-oriented empathy and self-control, and negatively associated with externalization of blame and hostility. Furthermore, inmates' proneness to guilt was significantly negatively correlated with risk assessment measures and psychological factors known to predict violent and nonviolent criminal recidivism. In contrast, inmates' shame proneness was unrelated to clinician ratings of psychopathy and violent risk, and positively correlated

with self-reported antisocial personality and criminogenic cognitions. Regarding actual criminal behavior, inmates' proneness to guilt, assessed shortly after incarceration, was negatively correlated with severity of current charges, prior jail experience, prior felony convictions, and custody level at the jail. In contrast, proneness to shame was unrelated to severity of current charges, prior jail experience, and custody level at the jail. Only proneness to "guilt-free" shame (the unique variance in shame, factoring out the variance in guilt) was modestly negatively correlated with serious offense history and prior felony convictions.

In summary, these studies of offenders indicate that the propensity to experience guilt about specific behaviors is a protective factor vis-à-vis severity of crime, involvement in the criminal justice system, and known predictors of recidivism. In contrast, there is little evidence that the propensity to experience shame serves an inhibitory function.

### **Understanding Adaptive and Maladaptive Effects of Shame and Guilt: Mediational Models**

Across multiple domains evidence shows that shame and guilt are differentially related to a number of psychological and behavioral constructs. Recent research has begun to delve deeper by examining the mediational pathways that underlie these relationships. A number of studies have converged to suggest that anger and externalization of blame appear to mediate the relationship between shame and aggression. Specifically, men's anger has been found to mediate the relationship between shame proneness and perpetration of psychological abuse in dating relationships (Harper et al., 2005). Stuewig and colleagues (2010) found that across four diverse samples (early adolescents, at-risk older adolescents, college students, and incarcerated adults), externalization of blame mediated the relationship between shame proneness and both verbal and physical aggression. Guilt proneness had the opposite effect; proneness to guilt was negatively related to aggression in three of the four samples, partially mediated through other-oriented empathy and accepting responsibility. Orth, Berking, and Burkhardt (2006) examined the role of rumination in the link



between negative self-conscious emotions and depression. Rumination mediated the link between shame and depression, but once shame was taken into account, no relationship was observed between guilt and depression, nor did rumination emerge as a mediating factor. In another study, avoidant coping was found to mediate the link between shame and depression (De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009), and, along similar lines, problems with emotion regulation appear to mediate the link between chronic shame and symptoms of eating disorders (Gupta et al., 2008).

In summary, the bivariate correlates of proneness to shame and guilt have been fairly well mapped out, but research examining more complex models involving mediation and moderation has just begun. We anticipate that future research will expand on this work considerably, clarifying the functional nature of the relationship of shame proneness and guilt proneness to a range of personality factors, psychological symptoms, and patterns of interpersonal behavior.

### **Why Do We Have the Capacity to Experience Shame?**

The research summarized throughout this chapter underscores the dark side of shame. Empirical findings in five areas illustrate the adaptive functions of guilt, in contrast to the hidden costs of shame, when considering both interpersonal adjustment and psychological well-being. An obvious question, then, is "Why do we have the capacity to experience this emotion anyway?" What adaptive purpose does it serve? Is it a moral emotion after all?

Certainly a characterological propensity to experience shame on a daily basis is maladaptive. Common sense tells us that the vast majority of people's quotidian transgressions and errors do not warrant a shameful, global condemnation of the self. It is overkill—rather like sending people to prison for a minor traffic violation. In the case of shame, the self-inflicted punishment often does not fit the crime.

Although a generalized proneness to shame is problematic, it is possible that state-specific feelings of shame can, in certain special circumstances, be useful. No doubt, there are occasional instances when

individuals are faced with fundamental personal shortcomings (moral or otherwise) that would best be corrected. The acute pain of shame may, in some cases, motivate productive soul-searching and revisions to one's priorities and values. The challenge, then, is to engage in such introspection and self-repair without becoming sidetracked by defensive reactions (e.g., denial, externalization, and anger) so often provoked by shame. Perhaps non-shame-prone, high "ego-strength" individuals with a solid sense of self may occasionally use shame constructively in the privacy of their own thoughts. Such adaptive uses of shame may be especially likely in the case of private, self-generated experiences of shame as opposed to public, other-generated shame episodes. But for most people, the debilitating, ego-threatening nature of shame makes such constructive outcomes difficult, if not impossible.

The more relevant question may not be "What adaptive purpose might shame serve now?" but rather "What purpose might it have served at earlier stages of evolution?" Shame may represent a relatively primitive emotion that more clearly served adaptive functions in the distant past, among ancestors whose cognitive processes were less sophisticated in the context of a much simpler human society. This notion is consistent with the sociobiological approach, taken by Gilbert (1997), Fessler (1999), and others. Fessler, for example, describes a primitive form of shame—protoshame—as an early mechanism for communicating submission, thus affirming relative rank in the dominance hierarchy of early humans. Similarly, Gilbert (1997) has discussed the appeasement functions of shame and humiliation displays, noting continuities across human and non-human primates (see also Keltner [1995] and Leary, Landel, & Patton's [1996] analysis of the appeasement functions of blushing and embarrassment). This perspective emphasizes the role of shame (and embarrassment) as a means of communicating one's acknowledgment of wrongdoing, thus defusing anger and aggression. In a related fashion, the motivation to withdraw—so often a component of the shame experience—may be a useful response, interrupting potentially threatening social interactions until the shamed individual has a chance to regroup or the situation has blown over.

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Fessler (2007) articulated an additional potentially adaptive function of shame, also arising from an evolutionary perspective. Drawing on a distinction between "dominance" hierarchies, in which an elevated social position is acquired by threat or force, and "prestige" hierarchies, in which individuals are selected to elevated positions by observers (the lower rank and file; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), Fessler argued that in prestige hierarchies, the appeasement functions of shame may be less a means of avoiding bodily injury and more a signal that one is a trustworthy partner who takes seriously social norms. This is important in modern prestige hierarchies that rely heavily on cooperative ventures, where participants take risks by investing time, energy, and/or resources, and by passing up other opportunities. Because the potential for exploitation is high, one's reputation as a trustworthy partner is extremely important. When individuals who transgress express clear signs of shame, they protect their reputation as a trustworthy potential partner who is still "on the same page" as others. In contrast, the reputations of apparently shameless transgressors are tarnished; they are no longer attractive as trustworthy cooperative partners. Supporting this account, research on a sample of over 1,000 North Americans ranging widely in age found that both men and women rated opposite-sex targets who displayed shame as sexually attractive, more so than men who displayed happiness and women who displayed pride (Tracy & Beall, 2011). Our sense is that expressions of guilt (especially when accompanied by apologies and efforts to make reparation) can serve the same important reputation-repairing function—perhaps even more effectively.

Finally, in an intriguing series of studies, de Hooze, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) showed that shame can prompt prosocial behavior but only under particular conditions, namely, only toward people whom participants imagined were aware of the shaming event, and only among participants low in prosocial orientation. In follow-up studies, de Hooze, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2010) showed that shame is associated with approach and repair motives specifically in academic contexts, where the probability of subsequent success is high. Consistent with the notion that shame may

be less problematic (and potentially positive) in circumscribed areas of life, Thompson and Berenbaum (2006) demonstrated that shame in interpersonal but not academic contexts was associated with both current and past depressive disorders. In contrast, the conditions under which guilt motivates reparative or prosocial behavior are much broader in circumstance and personal attributes (de Hooze et al., 2007).

From a variety of perspectives, then, guilt may be the more modern, adaptive moral emotion. Humankind has evolved in terms of emotional and cognitive complexity. With increasingly complex perspective-taking and attributional abilities, modern human adults have the capacity to distinguish between oneself and one's behavior, to take another person's perspective, and to empathize with others' distress. Whereas early moral goals centered on reducing potentially lethal aggression, clarifying social rank, and enhancing conformity to social norms, modern morality centers on the ability to acknowledge one's wrongdoing, accept responsibility, and take reparative action. Among the self-conscious emotions, guilt stands out as particularly well suited to motivate reparative interpersonal behavior that strengthens our bonds and supports cooperative effort.

### When Does Guilt Become Maladaptive?

Why is guilt frequently cited as a symptom in psychological disorders such as anxiety and depression? What is the chronic, ruminative guilt described by so many clinicians? One possibility is that problematic guilt experiences are actually feelings of guilt *fused with feelings of shame*. It seems likely that when a person begins with a guilt experience ("Oh, look at what a horrible *thing* I have *done*") but then magnifies and generalizes the event to him- or herself ("... and aren't I a horrible *person*"), many of the advantages of guilt are lost. Not only is the person faced with tension and remorse over a specific behavior that needs to be fixed, but he or she is also saddled with feelings of contempt and disgust for being a bad, defective person. In effect, shame-fused guilt may be just as problematic as shame itself. In fact, research shows that the unique variance in guilt (the part of guilt that is independent of shame) is most clearly related to positive interpersonal

behaviors and adjustment. Co-occurrence of shame and guilt is associated with poor outcomes, much as is shame unaccompanied by guilt.

Problems are also likely to arise when people develop an exaggerated or distorted sense of responsibility for events beyond their control. Survivor guilt is a prime example of such a problematic guilt response that has been consistently linked to PTSD and other psychological problems (Kubany et al., 1995, 2004; O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 2002). Research has also underscored the negative effects of caregiver guilt (Gallagher, Phillips, Oliver, & Carroll, 2008; Gonyea, Paris, & de Saxe Zerden, 2008; Spillers, Wellisch, Kim, Matthews, & Baker, 2008), which presumably entails an exaggerated sense of responsibility for ailing older adult parents or disabled family members.

Some psychologists (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Luyten et al., 2002) have suggested that the scenario-based measures such as the TOSCA (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989) fail to capture pathological forms of guilt. The TOSCA family of measures, for example, tap feelings of shame and guilt with respect to failures or transgressions for which the person was responsible. The measures do not capture problematic tendencies to take responsibility for and feel intense guilt over situations that are beyond reasonable responsibility (e.g., many instances of survivor guilt: O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 1999; O'Connor, Berry, Weiss, Bush, & Sampson, 1997; a young child's sense of responsibility for a parent's psychological welfare: Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). In a telling experimental study of elementary school-age children, Ferguson and colleagues (2000) varied the degree to which situations in a scenario-based measure were ambiguous with respect to responsibility. They found a positive relationship between internalizing symptoms (e.g., depression) and proneness to guilt specifically in situations where responsibility was ambiguous. These findings are not unique. In their meta-analysis of studies of shame, guilt, and depression, Kim and colleagues (2011) found that whereas measures assessing "legitimate" guilt (for events for which individuals have responsibility) showed little relationship to depression (mean weighted effect size  $r = .06$ ), measures assessing guilt

involving unrealistic responsibility for negative events were positively linked to depression ( $r = .39$ ).

Finally, Nelissen and Zeelenberg (2009) found that guilt is apt to lead to self-denial or self-punishment when opportunities for reparation are blocked. In such instances, overcoming problematic guilt may require some creativity in identifying reparative paths. For example, although one may not be able to undo a past misdeed directly (a forgotten anniversary), one can take constructive future-oriented steps (developing a better system for tracking important dates, arranging an impromptu getaway with one's partner).

In summary, problems with guilt are apt to arise when people have an exaggerated or distorted sense of responsibility for events, when guilt becomes fused with shame, and when people fail to find a path toward reparation (Dearing & Tangney, 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In contrast, guilt's benefits are most likely to be evident when people take appropriate responsibility for their misdeeds, acknowledge their failures and transgressions, and use the emotion's motivational force to develop and carry out a reparative plan commensurate with the magnitude of the transgression.

## Embarrassment

Embarrassment is clearly an important component of our self-regulatory apparatus. Miller (1995a) defined *embarrassment* as "an aversive state of mortification, abashment, and chagrin that follows public social predicaments" (p. 322). Analyzing personal accounts of embarrassment from hundreds of high school students and adults, Miller (1992) found that the most common causes of embarrassment were "normative public deficiencies"—situations in which the individual behaved in a clumsy, absent-minded, or hapless way (tripping in front of a large class, forgetting someone's name, unintended bodily-induced noises). Other common types of embarrassing situations included awkward social interactions and just plain being conspicuous.

Some theorists believe that the crux of embarrassment is negative evaluation by others (Edelmann, 1981; Miller, 1996; Miller

& Leary, 1992; Seor or transient drops to negative evaluation (Goffman, 1956; Leary, 1968). Other "dramaturgic" actors (Goffman, 1956; Leary, 1968; Leary, Sabini, & Parr, 1996) view embarrassment as a social role and scripts for these events signal that some aspect of behavior needs to be hidden, or change search shows that they are inclined to be designed to win a from others (Cupé Leary et al., 1996; Stafford, 1990).

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& Leary, 1992; Semin & Manstead, 1981) or transient drops in self-esteem secondary to negative evaluation by others (Modigliani, 1968). Other theorists subscribe to the "dramaturgic" account of embarrassment (Goffman, 1956; Gross & Stone, 1964; Silver, Sabini, & Parrott, 1987), surmising that embarrassment occurs when implicit social roles and scripts are disrupted. In all cases, these events signal that something is amiss—that some aspect of the person's identity or behavior needs to be carefully monitored, hidden, or changed. Not surprisingly, research shows that when embarrassed, people are inclined to behave in conciliatory ways designed to win approval and (re)inclusion from others (Cupach & Metts, 1990, 1992; Leary et al., 1996; Miller, 1996; Sharkey & Stafford, 1990).

Embarrassment apparently is less centrally relevant to the regulation of behavior in the moral domain. Whereas embarrassment often ensues in response to normative social faux-pas and transgressions (a forgotten name, an open fly, a flubbed performance), shame is more likely the response to serious failures and moral transgressions that reflect badly on global and enduring personal attributes. Consistent with this view, a comparison of adults' ratings of personal shame and embarrassment experiences indicated that shame is a more intense, painful emotion that involves a greater sense of moral transgression (Tangney, Miller, et al., 1996).

As with shame and guilt, people differ in the degree to which they are prone to experience embarrassment. Research has shown that embarrassment is associated with neuroticism, high levels of negative affect, self-consciousness, and a fear of negative evaluation from others (Edelmann & McCusker, 1986; Leary & Meadows, 1991; Miller, 1995b). Miller's (1996) research indicates that this fear of negative evaluation is not due to poor social skills, but rather to a sensitivity to social norms. Importantly with regard to self-regulation, people who are prone to embarrassment tend to be highly aware of and concerned with social rules and standards. Consistent with the notion that embarrassment serves a self-regulatory function, Keltner, Moffitt, and Stouthamer-Loeber (1995) found that aggressive and delinquent boys showed less embarrassment on a cognitive task than did well-adjusted boys.

## Pride

Of the self-conscious emotions, pride, until recently the neglected sibling, received the least attention by far. Mascolo and Fischer (1995) defined *pride* as an emotion "generated by appraisals that one is responsible for a socially valued outcome or for being a socially valued person" (p. 66). From their perspective, pride serves to enhance people's self-worth and, perhaps more importantly, to encourage future behavior that conforms to social standards of worth or merit. Indeed, a growing body of research suggests that pride plays a critical role in promoting social status and increasing an individual's inclusion within his or her social group.

Researchers adopting an evolutionary perspective argue that pride exists in humans to serve an important function: the promotion of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors oriented toward increasing or maintaining one's place within the social hierarchy (Tracy et al., 2010). Pride has been argued to influence status and social worth by at least three different causal paths. First, experiencing pride in response to achievements motivates striving for future achievements, typically in socially valued domains. Pride feelings are pleasurable and thus reinforcing; there is no other emotion that not only makes individuals feel good but also makes them feel good about *themselves*. Through socialization, children come to experience pride in response to praise for socially valued achievements—first by their parents, and later by teachers and peers. Eventually, individuals experience pride in response to these accomplishments even without others' evaluations (although positive feedback from others can certainly enhance a pride experience, by making the social value of a given achievement more apparent). The reinforcing properties of pride then motivate individuals to seek future achievements, so, without the need for external evaluations, individuals strive to develop an identity that coheres with social norms. Individuals who are successful in this pursuit are, in turn, rewarded with social approval, acceptance, and increased social status—all of which promote adaptive fitness.

This account of pride, as adaptive through its reinforcing and motivational properties, is supported by several findings. First,

Ross, Heine, Wilson, and Sugimori (2005) found that pride (at least as experienced by European Canadians) improves memory for pride-eliciting events and makes these events seem temporally more recent. These cognitive changes likely facilitate behaviors oriented toward ensuring that similar events occur in the future. Second, Williams and DeSteno (2008) found that participants who were led to experience pride in response to task success are more likely to persevere at subsequent similar tasks, suggesting that the experience of pride directly promotes a desire and willingness to achieve. Similarly, Herrald and Tomaka (2002) found that participants manipulated to experience pride showed improved task performance both during and immediately following the pride experience, and Verbeke, Belschak, and Bagozzi (2004) found that salespeople who report a tendency to experience pride in response to work success show better job performance, exert more effort at work, and report greater motivation toward productivity and success.

In addition to motivating achievement, a second way in which pride likely promotes status is through its informational properties. According to the "affect as information" hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), emotional feelings inform individuals of changes in their environment, and thereby allow them to respond knowingly and flexibly to significant events. Building on this account, pride may inform individuals that they merit increased status and group acceptance. In fact, given that trait pride (along with shame) is the emotional disposition most strongly related to self-esteem (Brown & Marshall, 2001), pride may over the long term serve this informational function through its influence on self-esteem. Researchers have suggested that self-esteem functions as a social barometer, or "sociometer," informing individuals of their social status and thereby ensuring that they behave in ways that maintain their status and others' acceptance, and avoid group rejection (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Pride may be the affective mechanism that leads to increases in self-esteem that feed into the sociometer. Specifically, when individuals experience a success, they feel pride in response, and over time and with repetition these feelings, may promote positive feelings

and thoughts about their personal characteristics, leading to the high self-esteem that informs individuals of their social value. (Indeed, shame's negative impact on self-esteem may have a similar function, informing individuals that they are *not* socially valued, but rather are in danger of social rejection and should seek to remove themselves from their current social context.) Supporting this account, pride is the positive emotion most strongly associated with (low) depression (Gruber, Oveis, Keltner, & Johnson, 2011); this link may be due to the knowledge acquired from pride feelings, that the proud individual is socially valued and need not fall prey to mental health problems.

The third way that pride seems to enhance social status is through its nonverbal expression. This distinct, cross-culturally recognized nonverbal display (Tracy & Robins, 2008) functions to inform observers (other social group members) that the proud individual deserves—or believes he or she deserves—higher status. Supporting this account, Tiedens, Ellsworth, and Mesquita (2000) found that individuals who are believed to be experiencing pride are assumed by others to have high status, suggesting an intuitive association between others' perceptions of pride and status. More directly supporting this link, Williams and DeSteno (2009) found that individuals manipulated to experience pride prior to engaging in a group task were perceived by others in the group and by outside observers as behaving in a more "dominant" manner during the task, suggesting that something about the pride experience promoted interpersonal behaviors that increased perceived status.

Other findings indicate what the key interpersonal behaviors that generated these dominant perceptions are likely to be: the pride nonverbal expression. Using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), a series of studies found that the pride expression is rapidly and automatically perceived as a signal of high status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009). This automatic association between the pride expression and high status cannot be explained as an artifact of particular features of the pride display, such as extended arms making the individual appear larger, or as a general property of positive emotions or positive valence. In these studies, pride was more strongly associated with

high status than and negative emotion and anger. This association between status generalizes among both Canadian and Fijian villagers and culturally isolated society (Tracy, 2011). Especially, social norms inhibit any status displays finding across the suggests that the pride may be an adaptation communicating a desire for pride displays, and resources, attention benefits; but it would who could more easily tus hierarchy by science, knowing w productive alliance own status jockey

In summary, a suggests that pride maintain an individual worth. However of pride—as a reinforcing emotional philosophical and long held that pride sinful emotion (similarly, several psychologists pride has a "dark" tion with achievement in its connection been theoretically conflict and aggression Lewis, 2000; Morf Kang, 2005; Morf study found that promoted a sense not weak others, s even inhibit competition (Oveis, Horberg, &

### A Tale of Two Faces

Building on these ers have proposed distinct kinds of pride (Lewis, 200 Tracy & Robins,

high status than a range of other positive and negative emotions—including happiness and anger. Furthermore, the automatic association between pride displays and high status generalizes across cultures; it emerged among both Canadian university students and Fijian villagers living in a geographically and culturally isolated small-scale traditional society (Tracy, Shariff, Zhao, & Henrich, 2011). Especially given evidence that Fijian social norms inhibit the open expression of any status displays, the generalization of this finding across these disparate populations suggests that the pride nonverbal expression may be an adaptation for automatically communicating a deserved status increase. This communication would clearly be adaptive to pride displayers, who would receive greater resources, attention, and other status-related benefits; but it would also benefit observers, who could more effectively navigate the status hierarchy by showing appropriate deference, knowing whom to emulate, forming productive alliances, and facilitating their own status jockeying.

In summary, a growing body of evidence suggests that pride evolved to promote and maintain an individual's status and social worth. However, this conceptualization of pride—as a prosocial and achievement-reinforcing emotion—may be too narrow; philosophical and religious accounts have long held that pride is an amoral and even sinful emotion (see Tracy et al., 2010). Similarly, several psychologists have noted that pride has a “dark side”; despite its association with achievement and altruism, pride—in its connection to narcissism—has also been theoretically linked with relationship conflict and aggression (Kernberg, 1975; Lewis, 2000; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). One study found that manipulated pride feelings promoted a sense of similarity to strong, but not weak others, suggesting that pride might even inhibit compassion for those in need (Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010).

### A Tale of Two Facets

Building on these findings, several researchers have proposed that there are two distinct kinds of pride: *authentic* and *hubristic* pride (Lewis, 2000; Tangney et al., 1989; Tracy & Robins, 2007).<sup>1</sup> A number of stud-

ies support this two-facet account. First, when asked to think about and list words relevant to pride, research participants consistently generate two very different categories of concepts, which empirically form two separate clusters of semantic meaning. The first cluster (authentic pride) includes words such as *accomplished* and *confident*, and fits with the prosocial, achievement-oriented conceptualization of pride. The second cluster (hubristic pride) includes words such as *arrogant* and *conceited*, and fits with a self-aggrandizing conceptualization. Second, when asked to rate their feelings during an actual pride experience, participants' ratings consistently form two relatively independent factors that closely parallel these two semantic clusters. Third, when asked to rate their general dispositional tendency to feel each of a set of pride-related emotional states (i.e., trait pride, or “pride proneness”), participants' ratings again form the same two factors. Further analyses have demonstrated that the two pride factors are not artifacts of participants' tendency to group together good versus bad, activated versus deactivated, or trait versus state words.

How might we understand the distinction between these two facets of pride? Like shame and guilt, the two facets of pride appear to be elicited by distinct causal attributions for events—though, in the case of pride, eliciting events tend to be largely about success and accomplishment rather than failure and social transgression. Specifically, pride is elicited when individuals appraise a positive event as relevant to their identity (i.e., their important self-representations) and their goals for their identity (i.e., their ideal self-representations), and as internally caused—that is, due to the self (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lewis, 2000; Roseman, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Weiner, 1985). Authentic and hubristic pride are further distinguished by attributions; authentic pride seems to result from attributions to internal but unstable, specific, and controllable causes, such as effort (“I won because I practiced”), whereas hubristic pride results from attributions to internal but stable, global, and uncontrollable causes, such as ability (“I won because I'm great”). In other words, the distinction between the two facets of pride mirrors the distinction between guilt and shame; it is the distinction between crediting (or blaming)

one's behavior versus one's global characteristics.

One study supporting these links found that individuals who were told to attribute a hypothetical success experience (i.e., a positive, identity-relevant and identity-goal congruent event) to their hard work (unstable, specific attribution) expected to feel authentic pride in response, whereas those told to attribute the same success to their stable, global ability expected to experience relatively higher levels of hubristic pride. Another study found that individuals who tend to make internal but unstable and controllable attributions for a wide range of events also tend to be dispositionally prone to authentic pride, whereas those who tend to make internal but stable and uncontrollable attributions for a range of events tend to be prone to hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Thus, authentic pride is more closely linked to attributions to effort, hard work, and specific accomplishments, whereas hubristic pride is more closely linked to attributions to talents, abilities, and global positive traits (Verbeke et al., 2004). Research on perceptions of others' pride mirrors these results; when viewing target individuals who display a nonverbal expression of pride and simultaneously suggest that their success was due to stable, global abilities (e.g., intelligence), observers tend to judge the pride displays as hubristic; whereas the same nonverbal displays shown by targets who suggest that their success was due to unstable, specific efforts are more likely to be judged as authentic pride (Tracy & Prehn, in press).

### **Authentic and Hubristic Pride Are Not Equally Moral**

Like shame and guilt, hubristic and authentic pride do not seem to be equally moral emotions. In fact, the two pride facets appear to elicit markedly different social behaviors and to have highly divergent effects on personality, parallel to the distinct effects of shame and guilt (Ashton-James & Tracy, 2011; Carver, Sinclair, & Johnson, 2010; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2007). These findings help to resolve the long-standing question of whether pride is psychologically healthy and virtuous or narcissistic and "sinful"; contra-

dictory conceptions may exist because, at both the trait and state levels, one facet is associated with a likable and socially desirable personality profile and prosocial behaviors, whereas the other is associated with a more negative profile and antisocial behaviors. Specifically, authentic pride is positively related to the generally adaptive Big Five traits of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experience, whereas hubristic pride is consistently negatively related to the two prosocial traits of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (Tracy & Robins, 2007). In addition, authentic pride is positively related to both explicit and implicit self-esteem, whereas hubristic pride is negatively related to implicit and explicit self-esteem, yet positively related to narcissism and shame proneness (Tracy et al., 2009).

Indeed, the two facets of pride seem to lie at the affective core of the distinction between narcissism and self-esteem, and may account for research suggesting that these two forms of self-favorability are associated with highly divergent outcomes (Paulhus et al., 2004). Specifically, hubristic pride may underlie narcissistic aggression, hostility, interpersonal problems, and other self-destructive behaviors (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell, 1999; Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1977; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). In contrast, authentic pride may promote positive behaviors in the achievement domain (Weiner, 1985; Williams & DeSteno, 2008) and contribute to prosocial investments and the development of a genuine and deep-rooted sense of self-esteem (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lazarus, 1991; Verbeke et al., 2004). In fact, at the trait level (i.e., pride proneness), the two facets show divergent relations with constructs relevant to achievement, mental health, social behavior, and relationship functioning (Carver et al., 2010; Tracy et al., 2009). Specifically, individuals high in dispositional authentic pride tend to be low in depression, trait anxiety, social phobia, aggression, hostility, and rejection sensitivity; high in self-control, goal engagement, relationship satisfaction, dyadic adjustment, and social support; and they typically are securely attached to their relationship partners. In contrast, individuals high in dispositional hubristic pride are more likely to demonstrate impulsivity; to

experience chronic aggression, hostility, antisocial misbehavior (crimes); and to show contempt and social support. Authentic pride places on the Interpersonal Adjective Scales the independent dimensions of communion; kindness; and individualism. Individuals high in authentic pride experience both facets of pride in communion are positive; hubristic pride is associated with communion (Tracy, 2010). Together, the authentic pride is the achievement-oriented whereas hubristic pride is the social and aggressive self-aggrandizement defensive response to shame.

The moral distinction and hubristic pride studies demonstrate have divergent effects. Form of bias against James & Tracy, 2009 evidenced first at the timeicans high in authentic pride to report low level of Americans (based on Scale; McConahay, 1986) whereas white Americans report higher pride. White participants report higher hubristic pride response. Americans in less than 1 to whites who were authentic pride and no-emotion control. Heterosexual participants feel hubristic pride and punitive judgment compared to a heterosexual contrast, individuals demonstrated less both outgroups, and ingroup members demonstrating a the outgroup. A the effects of both social judgments and empathic concern



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plicit self-esteem,  
negatively related  
lf-esteem, yet posi-  
and shame prone-

pride seem to lie at  
istinction between  
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at these two forms  
ociated with highly  
hus et al., 2004).  
e may underlie nar-  
rality, interpersonal  
destructive behav-  
& Boden, 1996;  
1998; Campbell,  
ohut, 1977; Morf  
contrast, authentic  
ve behaviors in the  
er, 1985; Williams  
ntribute to proso-  
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ense of self-esteem  
12; Lazarus, 1991;  
ct, at the trait level  
e two facets show  
onstructs relevant  
alth, social behav-  
tioning (Carver et  
.009). Specifically,  
ositional authen-  
n depression, trait  
gression, hostility,  
igh in self-control,  
nship satisfaction,  
ocial support; and  
y attached to their  
contrast, individu-  
hubristic pride are  
te impulsivity; to

experience chronic anxiety; to engage in ag-  
gression, hostility, and a range of other an-  
tisocial misbehaviors (e.g., drug use, petty  
crimes); and to show poorer dyadic adjust-  
ment and social support. Given these diver-  
gent personality profiles, it is not surprising  
that the pride facets are located in different  
places on the Interpersonal Circumplex (i.e.,  
the independent dimensions of agency and  
communion; Kiesler, 1983). Although indi-  
viduals high in agency are prone to experi-  
encing both facets of pride, individuals high  
in communion are only prone to authentic  
pride; hubristic pride shows a negative rela-  
tionship with communal traits (Cheng et al.,  
2010). Together, these findings suggest that  
authentic pride is the more moral, prosocial,  
achievement-oriented facet of the emotion,  
whereas hubristic pride is the more antisoc-  
ial and aggressive facet that is related to  
self-aggrandizement and, in part, may be a  
defensive response to underlying feelings of  
shame.

The moral distinction between authentic  
and hubristic pride is further supported by  
studies demonstrating that the two facets  
have divergent effects on prejudice, in the  
form of bias against outgroups (Ashton-  
James & Tracy, 2011). This distinction was  
evidenced first at the trait level; white Amer-  
icans high in authentic pride proneness tend  
to report low levels of racism against black  
Americans (based on the Modern Racism  
Scale; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981),  
whereas white Americans high in hubristic  
pride report higher levels of racism. Second,  
white participants who were led to feel hu-  
bristic pride responded by describing Asian  
Americans in less favorable terms compared  
to whites who were manipulated to feel au-  
thentic pride and compared to those in a  
no-emotion control condition; similarly,  
heterosexual participants manipulated to  
feel hubristic pride subsequently made more  
punitive judgments of a homosexual, com-  
pared to a heterosexual, prostitute. In con-  
trast, individuals led to feel authentic pride  
demonstrated less bias against members of  
both outgroups, and judged outgroup and  
ingroup members equally, at times even  
demonstrating a slight preference toward  
the outgroup. A final study revealed that  
the effects of both pride facets on prejudi-  
cial judgments and beliefs were mediated by  
empathic concern for the evaluative target.

Specifically, hubristic pride decreases empa-  
thy for stigmatized others, which leads to  
increased prejudice, whereas authentic pride  
increases empathy for stigmatized others,  
which reduces prejudice.

### Why Do We Have the Capacity to Experience Hubristic Pride?

If pride evolved as a moral emotion to serve  
the distal function of promoting high status  
and social worth and maintaining group  
inclusion, the question arises: Why would  
such an adaptive emotional experience have  
a "dark side"? Why might an antisocial (hu-  
bristic) facet have evolved?

One answer may be found in Henrich and  
Gil-White's (2001) distinction between *dom-  
inance*, the fear-based form of high status,  
and *prestige*, the respect-based form of high  
status. Authentic pride may have evolved to  
motivate the attainment of prestige, whereas  
hubristic pride may have evolved to motivate  
the attainment of dominance. Supporting  
this account, when individuals experience  
hubristic pride, they evaluate themselves as  
better in some way than others, and experi-  
ence a subjective sense of dominance, super-  
iority, and power. Hubristic pride may thus  
prepare people to assert their power (e.g.,  
making internal, stable, uncontrollable at-  
tributions for success), and motivate behav-  
iors that promote a reputation of dominance  
through hostility, aggression, and a tendency  
toward interpersonal conflict. This aggres-  
sion, or threat of aggression, allows domi-  
nant individuals to retain their power given  
that their high status is typically not merited  
on the basis of achievements or leadership  
abilities. The resulting sense of not quite de-  
serving one's status may be a cause of the  
shame and insecurity associated with hubris-  
tic pride. In contemporary society, dominant  
individuals may choose not to demonstrate  
their power through physical aggression but  
rather through verbal and nonverbal cues  
of aggression and hostility, such as behav-  
ioral displays of boredom, rudeness, and  
disengagement—a pattern recently found to  
typify the interpersonal interactions of indi-  
viduals high in socioeconomic status (Kraus  
& Keltner, 2009).

In contrast, in order to retain subordi-  
nates' respect, prestigious individuals must  
avoid succumbing to feelings of power and

superiority. Competition for prestige would likely favor individuals who demonstrate knowledge and a willingness to share it but do not arrogate their authority or lash out at subordinates; aggressive interpersonal behaviors would in some sense "raise the price" subordinates must pay to attain the valued knowledge. In fact, overly aggressive behaviors have been identified as attributes that can "break a leader" in largely prestige-based hierarchies (Ames & Flynn, 2007; Bass, 1990). Authentic pride thus may have evolved to facilitate the attainment of prestige by promoting a focus on one's effort and accomplishments (i.e., making internal, unstable, controllable attributions for success), fostering humility, and inhibiting aggression and hostility. The findings that state and trait authentic pride are associated with prosocial behavior, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and voluntary moral action (Hart & Matsuba, 2007; Tracy et al., 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Verbeke et al., 2004) are consistent with this account of authentic pride as promoting a prestigious (i.e., highly respected) reputation.

Two studies provide direct support for this functionalist explanation (Cheng et al., 2010). First, individuals high in trait authentic pride describe themselves as prestigious, whereas those high in trait hubristic pride describe themselves as dominant. Second, a study of varsity athletes who were high in trait authentic pride were viewed by their teammates as prestigious but not dominant, whereas those high in trait hubristic pride were viewed as dominant but not prestigious. That these findings emerged in peer ratings from teammates points to their ecological validity; varsity teams are real-world groups where status hierarchies play a major role in shaping intragroup behaviors and emotions.

In summary, both facets of pride may increase an individual's social status, but only authentic pride does so in a way that promotes moral behavior and boosts a kind of high status that is likely to be sustained over the long term. Dominance may be an effective means of gaining power in the short term, at least among those who have the ability to wield control over valuable resources, but dominant leaders are unlikely to retain their power because their hostile, aggressive, and overtly self-serving behaviors generate dislike and disrespect, and may even foment coalitions against them. Nonetheless, high

status—in the form of either prestige or dominance—has been associated with a range of outcomes that increase evolutionary fitness (e.g., improved physical and mental health, access to higher quality resources and mates; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Ellis, 1995), making it likely that pride promotes fitness, at least in the short term, regardless of whether the pride experienced is authentic or hubristic. Indeed, in the context of a single short-term group interaction, both dominance and prestige promote perceptions of high status and effective social influence, despite their divergent effects on social goals and interpersonal behaviors (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2011). Hubristic pride thus may be an emotion that, like shame, benefits certain people in certain circumscribed situations, despite also being associated with both psychological and social maladjustment.

### Cultural Differences in Shame, Guilt, and Pride

Shame, guilt, and pride are emotions experienced in reference to self. To the extent that the nature of the self differs across cultures and nations (Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), one might expect parallel differences in the experience and implications of self-conscious emotions. The research presented in this chapter thus far has largely been conducted in a Western context.

Cross-cultural questions about the self-conscious emotions can be asked at several levels. Do people from different cultures vary in their propensity to experience shame, guilt, embarrassment, authentic pride, or hubristic pride? Are there cultural differences in the *quality* of these emotions? In their valence or intensity? Or in the kinds of situations that give rise to them? Regarding individual differences within cultural groups, are there cultural differences in the types of parenting styles or other early experiences that foster the propensity to experience shame, guilt, embarrassment, or pride? And are there cultural differences in the implications of those individual differences? Is proneness to shame less maladaptive, a more effective self-regulatory mechanism, in interdependent cultures? This is just a sampling of the kinds of questions that have begun to

be examined by research and the self-concept.

Most studies in the self-concept literature have compared Asian and North Americans. Research on Asian Americans is likely to experience some differences from non-Asian Americans. Razzino, & Ferraritanasiripong, 1997) find differences in guilt proneness have been mixed (Lerner, 2002; Ratanasiripong, 1997) consistent with a cross-cultural perspective on nonverbal displays which found that individuals across cultures experience shame in response to failure as universal and possible. Shame—among significant differences from countries high in individualism (North American nations) were no more in response to failure (Cheng & Matsumoto, 2008) suggests that authentic societies may have different shame response behaviors, to confounding the highly public Olympic event.

Regarding pride in Olympic athletes, the expression in the face appears to be universal. Differences were found for like shame, were rarely genetically blind (Trautman). However, there are conceptualizations attached to the emotion though pride is a high out emotion in individualistic United States, Australia it is viewed as negative. Several collectivist cultures (Spain, Taiwan; Eickmeyer, Manstead, & Lieber, 1992) describing achievement students are less likely to report feelings of pride.

One possible explanation is that, in collectivist dominant concepts

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ed with a range of  
olutionary fitness  
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be examined by researchers interested in cul-  
ture and the self-conscious emotions.  
Most studies investigating cultural dif-  
ferences in the self-conscious emotions have  
compared Asian Americans and European  
Americans. Research consistently shows that  
Asian Americans report a greater propensi-  
ty to experience shame, compared to their  
non-Asian American counterparts (Lutwak,  
Razzino, & Ferrari, 1998; Miller, 2002; Ra-  
tanasiripong, 1997), whereas cultural differ-  
ences in guilt proneness within U.S. samples  
have been mixed (Lutwak et al., 1998; Mill-  
er, 2002; Ratanasiripong, 1997). This is con-  
sistent with a cross-cultural study of shame  
nonverbal displays among Olympic athletes,  
which found that while congenitally blind  
individuals across cultures reliably displayed  
shame in response to failure—suggesting a  
universal and possibly innate propensity for  
shame—among sighted individuals, athletes  
from countries high in individualism (i.e.,  
North American and Western European na-  
tions) were no more likely to display shame  
in response to failure than to success (Tracy  
& Matsumoto, 2008). This cultural differ-  
ence suggests that athletes from individualis-  
tic societies may have inhibited or suppressed  
their shame response, or its corresponding  
behaviors, to conform to social norms dur-  
ing the highly public situation of a televised  
Olympic event.  
Regarding pride, based on the study of  
Olympic athletes, the tendency to display  
the expression in response to success ap-  
pears to be universal and innate; no cultural  
differences were found, and pride displays,  
like shame, were reliably shown by the con-  
genitally blind (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008).  
However, there are cultural differences in  
conceptualizations of pride; and the value  
attached to the emotion. For example, al-  
though pride is a highly valued and sought  
out emotion in individualistic cultures (i.e.,  
United States, Australia, the Netherlands),  
it is viewed as negative and undesirable in  
several collectivistic cultures (i.e., China,  
Spain, Taiwan; Eid & Diener, 2001; Mos-  
quera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000). Similar-  
ly, Lieber and Yu (2003) reported that when  
describing achievement stories, Taiwanese  
students are less likely than Americans to re-  
port feelings of pride.  
One possible explanation for this distinc-  
tion is that, in collectivistic cultures, the pre-  
dominant conceptualization of pride may

be tilted more toward the hubristic facet,  
whereas in individualistic cultures, which  
place value on the individual over the group,  
the predominant conceptualization is tilted  
toward the authentic facet. Alternatively,  
both facets of pride may be accepted and  
valued in collectivistic cultures—as long  
as these pride experiences are about one's  
group instead of one's individual self (Hofst-  
ede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In  
fact, in a study comparing pride in China  
and the United States, Chinese participants  
reported feeling more positively about pride  
experiences that resulted from others' ac-  
complishments than from their own (Stipek,  
1998).  
Few studies have moved beyond a con-  
sideration of mean differences in prone-  
ness to shame, guilt, and pride to consider  
the possibility of cultural differences in the  
*correlates* of self-conscious emotions. Fon-  
taine and colleagues (2006) found that the  
structure of shame and guilt experiences  
was highly consistent across college students  
from Peru, Belgium, and Hungary (see also  
Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006). More-  
over, shame proneness was similarly associ-  
ated with anger (Bruno, 2000), depression  
and anxiety (Hyangsook, 2002), and self-  
doubts (Lutwak et al., 1998) among Asian  
Americans and non-Asian Americans. Re-  
garding the correlates of guilt, the findings  
are mixed. El-Jamil (2003) found a negative  
relationship between guilt proneness and  
hostility in a U.S. college sample but not  
among Lebanese college students. Lutwak  
and colleagues (2001) found no relation-  
ship between guilt-proneness and self-doubt  
among Asian American, European Ameri-  
can, Latin American, and African American  
students.  
Two studies have examined cross-cultural  
continuities and discontinuities in the cor-  
relates of shame and guilt, comparing  
American-born children with Asian-born  
children living in their country of origin.  
Bear and colleagues (2009) reported a posi-  
tive link between shame and anger among  
American children, but no such relation-  
ship among Japanese children. Comparing  
children residing in Japan, Korea, and the  
United States, Furukawa, Tangney, and Hi-  
gashihara (2011) found substantial group  
differences in the propensity to experience  
self-conscious emotions. Japanese children  
scored highest on shame proneness, Korean

children scored highest on guilt proneness, and U.S. children were highest on pride. Regarding the correlates of shame, it was hypothesized that shame would be less problematic among Japanese children relative to those raised in Korea and the United States because shame is more normative and would therefore be less painful in the self-critical Japanese culture. There were, however, surprisingly few differences in the relationship of shame to aggression-related cognitions, emotions, and behavior. In the face of failure or transgression, shame-prone children in Japan, Korea, and the United States were all more inclined to blame others and feel anger, relative to their less shame-prone peers. Notably, in no case did shame seem to inhibit aggression-relevant cognitions, emotion, or behavior. In short, although there were significant cultural differences in children's propensity to experience self-conscious emotions, the correlates of individual differences in shame and guilt were remarkably similar across these three cultures, at least with respect to anger and aggression.

### New Directions in Research on the Self-Conscious Emotions

A profusion of research on self-conscious emotions has emerged over the past two decades, but in a very real sense, we have only scratched the surface and much work remains. Here, we mention just a few of the promising new directions upon which researchers have begun to embark. Not surprisingly given the vast difference in historical research attention on shame and guilt compared to pride, most of these new research trends focus on the negative, rather than the positive, self-conscious emotions. Thus, one important direction for future research is to expand the literature on pride, perhaps using the large and ever-growing literature on shame and guilt as a model.

#### "Vicarious" and Group-Based Self-Conscious Emotions

Self-conscious emotions are typically experienced in reference to one's own attributes or behaviors. An intriguing phenomenon, then, is the vicarious experience of self-conscious emotions—people's experience of shame, guilt, embarrassment, or pride owing to the

actions of *other* individuals or groups. Some of the earliest research along these lines examined the causes and consequences of "empathic" or vicarious embarrassment (for a review, see Miller, 1996). More recently, investigators have examined "vicarious" or "group-based" shame and guilt. This research represents an exciting integration of self-conscious emotions theory with the social psychological literature on social identity, group-related processes. To the extent that the self is, in part, defined by interpersonal relations and group memberships, it is possible to construe the behavior of an ingroup member as reflecting on oneself. Thus, personal causality is not always necessary for the experience of shame or guilt.

In many ways, vicarious shame and guilt parallel personal shame and guilt experiences. Lickel, Schmader, and colleagues (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005; Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007) have developed a process model linking specific types of appraisals with vicarious experiences of shame and guilt, respectively. They present compelling evidence that group-based shame is elicited when a threatened shared identity is salient. Vicarious guilt, on the other hand, is more likely when one's interpersonal interdependence with the perpetrator is salient, and when relational-based concerns are highlighted by a focus on harm to another group or individual. The link between identity concerns and vicarious or group-based shame is evident in both correlational and experimental studies (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2006; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). In addition, identification with the perpetrating group can also have implications for vicarious group-based guilt (Branscombe & Doojse, 2004; Doojse, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998), especially when individuals are prompted to focus on the harm done (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003).

As with personal guilt experiences, group-based guilt has been associated with empathy (Zebel, Doojse, & Spears, 2004) and a motivation to repair or make amends (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Iyer et al., 2003; Lickel et al., 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999; Zebel et al., 2004). Moreover, group-based guilt mediates the link between group-based empathy and corrective action (Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair,

& Swim, 2008). As experiences, vicarious (not guilt) has been distance oneself from (Johns, Schmader, & al., 2005), and shame positive effects of g et al., 2008). Further anger and shame is ing vicarious shame et al., 2005; Schn Nonetheless, there : vicarious or group- "kinder, gentler" s (de Hooze et al., 20 some circumstance appears to motivate change the image tive fashion (Lickel Sherman, 2006).

#### "Guilt-Tripping" to Use Self-Conscious as a Form of Social

People sometimes : of shame, guilt, and as a form of inter (1991, 1992, 1993) in our understanding rassment—efforts feelings of embarrass on data from over Sharkey concluded efforts to induce vated by benign, sign of affection. 7 studies have explicit tion (Baumeister : Daly, & Rudnick, ies indicate that de guilt occur relative in the context of especially in respo periods of neglect main. For example methods to induce embarrassment, are the relative co ing shame, guilt, : do those costs an tion of transgress and personality c ee? Are some peo others to guilt (or inductions?

als or groups. Some along these lines id consequences of embarrassment (for 96). More recently, ned "vicarious" or nd guilt. This re- iting integration of heory with the so- ure on social iden- sses. To the extent lefined by interper- ip memberships, it he behavior of an ecting on oneself. is not always neces- : shame or guilt. us shame and guilt nd guilt experienc- d colleagues (Lick- :sau, 2004; Lickel, er, & Ames, 2005; novic, 2007) have lel linking specific vicarious experi- , respectively. They lence that group- when a threatened t. Vicarious guilt, e likely when one's idence with the d when relational- ighted by a focus up or individual. y concerns and vi- hame is evident in perimental studies l, 2006; Schmader tion, identification up can also have group-based guilt ;, 2004; Doojse, Manstead, 1998), als are prompted ie (Iyer, Leach, & experiences, group- ated with empathy , 2004) and a mo- e amends (Brown, inzi, & Cehajic, ickel et al., 2005; ebel et al., 2004). guilt mediates the empathy and cor- ntsinger, Sinclair,

& Swim, 2008). As with personal shame experiences, vicarious group-based shame (but not guilt) has been linked to a desire to distance oneself from the shame-eliciting event (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005), and shame appears to weaken the positive effects of group-based guilt (Brown et al., 2008). Furthermore, the link between anger and shame is evident when considering vicarious shame (Iyer et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Nonetheless, there are some indications that vicarious or group-based shame may have a "kinder, gentler" side than personal shame (de Hooij et al., 2008). For example, under some circumstances, group-based shame appears to motivate in people a desire to change the image of the group in a proactive fashion (Lickel, Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2006).

**"Guilt-Tripping" and Other Efforts to Use Self-Conscious Emotions as a Form of Social Control**

People sometimes attempt to induce feelings of shame, guilt, and embarrassment in others as a form of interpersonal control. Sharkey (1991, 1992, 1993) made important inroads in our understanding of *intentional embarrassment*—efforts to intentionally cause feelings of embarrassment in others. Based on data from over 1,000 adult respondents, Sharkey concluded that fully half of people's efforts to induce embarrassment are motivated by benign, friendly intentions—as a sign of affection. To date, only a handful of studies have explicitly examined guilt induction (Baumeister et al., 1995a; Vangelisti, Daly, & Rudnick, 1991). These initial studies indicate that deliberate attempts to induce guilt occur relatively frequently, particularly in the context of close relationships, and especially in response to real or perceived periods of neglect. But other questions remain. For example, do people use different methods to induce shame versus guilt versus embarrassment, and with what result? What are the relative costs and benefits of inducing shame, guilt, and embarrassment? How do those costs and benefits vary as a function of transgression, type of relationship, and personality characteristics of the inducer? Are some people more vulnerable than others to guilt (or shame or embarrassment) inductions?

**Context- or Domain-Specific Shame and Guilt**

A number of researchers have developed measures to assess shame and guilt with respect to specific domains. For example, researchers concerned with the psychology of eating disorders and those exploring hypotheses drawn from Frederickson and Robert's (1997) objectification theory have assessed feelings of shame specifically in reference to one's body. "Body shame" has been consistently associated with self-objectification and eating disorder symptoms (e.g., Breines, Crocker, & Garcia, 2008; Calogero, 2009; Grabe, Hyde, & Lindberg, 2007; Knauss, Paxton, & Alsaker, 2008; Lindberg, Grabe, & Hyde, 2007; Mercurio & Landry, 2008; Skarderud, 2007; Slater & Tiggemann, 2010; Tiggemann & Boundy, 2008; Wiseman & Moradi, 2010). Moreover, weight-related shame and guilt appear to be differentially related to coping and dietary restraint (Conradt et al., 2008). Specifically, weight-related shame has been negatively associated with problem-focused coping, whereas weight-related guilt has been positively related to problem-focused coping.

Regarding guilt, researchers have examined the nature and implications of domain-specific feelings of guilt associated with trauma. Trauma-related guilt cognitions, such as false beliefs about responsibility or pre-outcome knowledge, are reliably associated with symptoms of depression among diverse samples of trauma survivors (Blacher, 2000; Kubany et al., 1995, 2004; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001; Marx et al., 2010). Moreover, cognitive processing therapy and prolonged exposure interventions appear effective at reducing trauma-related guilt cognitions (Nishith, Nixon, & Resick, 2005; Resick, Nishith, Weaver, Astin, & Feuer, 2002). Perhaps owing to similar feelings of unrealistic responsibility, caregiver guilt has been repeatedly associated with high levels of stress and psychological symptoms (Gallagher et al., 2008; Spillers et al., 2008).

**Psychobiological Correlates of the Self-Conscious Emotions**

Researchers have begun to evaluate psychobiological markers of shame, examining biological responses to laboratory manipulations designed to threaten the social self

(Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004; Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004; see Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004, for a review). Dickerson, Kemeny, and colleagues (2004) found that participants who wrote about incidents involving heavy doses of self-blame, compared to those who wrote about mundane daily activities, evidenced increased levels of self-reported shame (and guilt) from pre- to posttest. Importantly, increases in shame (but not guilt or general negative affect) coincided with increased proinflammatory cytokine activity (Dickerson, Kemeny, et al., 2004). At the trait level, proneness to shame has also been associated with inflammatory activity (Rohleder, Chen, Wolf, & Miller, 2008).

Other immunological research is equally suggestive: Among HIV positive individuals, persistent feelings of shame (but not other negative emotions) were positively related to prospective T-cell decline, an indicator of compromised immune function (Weitzman, Kemeny, & Fahey, 2004).

Experiences of shame have also been linked to elevated cortisol in studies of adults (Gruenewald et al., 2004) and children (Lewis & Ramsay, 2002). Importantly, Dickerson, Gruenewald, and colleagues (2004) noted that shame, cortisol, and proinflammatory cytokine system activation increased specifically in response to social-evaluative threat (negative social evaluation and rejection), but not in response to more general negative affect or distress. They hypothesized that individual differences in shame proneness may be correlated with individual differences in immunosystem responsivity, and that state experiences of shame and related emotions may be the mediating mechanism for biological response to social threat.

Cardiovascular reactivity is also associated with shame. For example, in addition to assessing cortisol response, Gruenewald and colleagues (2004) assessed heart rate and blood pressure changes in response to stressful speaking and arithmetic tasks. Although heart rate and systolic blood pressure increased in both the social-evaluative and nonevaluative conditions, the response was more marked in the social-evaluative condition. Extending this work with a clever laboratory manipulation of experienced emotions, Herrald and Tomaka (2002) evaluated cardiovascular reactivity in the wake of pride, shame, and anger. They found that

shame and anger resulted in higher levels of cardiovascular reactivity than did pride; importantly, participants in the shame condition showed higher peripheral resistance (associated with hypertension), and participants in the anger condition showed higher cardiac contractility (associated with coronary disease).

In summary, there seem to be distinct physiological correlates that correspond to the experience of shame. Such physiological markers may prove useful as a measurement tool in future research on situation-specific states of shame, but it will be important for such studies to adopt a multimethod approach, assessing shame simultaneously via physiology, self-report, and nonverbal behavior, given limitations associated with each method when applied to this complex and often hidden emotion.

Regarding brain regions associated with self-conscious emotions, Blair and Cipolotti (2000) found that damage to the right frontal lobe is associated with problems comprehending embarrassing situations, and orbitofrontal cortex damage is associated with an inability to experience embarrassment over inappropriate behavior, as well as excessive experiences of pride (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Beer, John, Scabini, & Knight, 2006). Activation of medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior superior temporal sulcus have both been implicated in the experience of embarrassment and guilt, based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research (Takahashi et al., 2004; for a review see Robins & Schriber, 2009). Each of these regions appears to be associated with self-referential processes (see Beer, Chapter 29, this volume). An fMRI study of pride found greater activation in the posterior superior temporal sulcus and left temporal lobe—two brain regions thought to be involved in theory of mind—when participants imagined themselves in pride-eliciting scenarios compared to neutral scenarios. Although theory of mind may be an important cognitive prerequisite for pride (self-evaluations require the understanding that others can evaluate oneself), these researchers had expected to find greater medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activation given previous findings of mPFC activity during experiences of embarrassment, guilt, and shame, as well as research indicating that the mPFC is central to self-referential

thought (e.g., Fossati et al., 2002). The failure in imagined pride elicitation of a number of questions, but not others, to be replicated, ideally, activation during pride, and other positive emotions, control for shared effects toward. Using electrodermal measures, Amodio, Devine, and O'Connor (2007) showed that activation in the right frontal cortical asymmetry is initially associated with reduced approach, but shortly thereafter is associated with positive behavior and withdrawal from thought to be associated with approach motivation.

## Conclusions

Understanding the self is critical to understanding human behavior. This has made much progress in empirical work since the 1950s, but a significant volume of work remains to be done. The fertile ground and conditions ripe for inquiry into other emotions, the self-conscious emotions, challenges. Although a number of methods have been developed (see Robins, Nofziger, & Tracy, 2006, for a review), the coming improvements in our understanding of emotions, further research in this area of research.

## Note

1. We have adopted the term *hubristic* to emphasize the self-referential nature of authentic pride (see Robins & Schriber, 2009, for a review) and is like feelings of self-worth, the full range of interpersonal affect may be important to understand (see Tracy & Robins, 2004, for a review). The term "achievement-oriented hubristic pride" is

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thought (e.g., Fossati et al., 2003; Kircher et al., 2002). The failure to find mPFC activity in imagined pride experiences raises a number of questions, but these findings need to be replicated, ideally in studies that compare activation during pride to activation during other positive emotional experiences, to control for shared effects of positivity and reward. Using electroencephalographic methods, Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) showed that prejudice-related guilt is initially associated with right-sided frontal cortical asymmetry thought to be associated with reduced approach motivation, but shortly thereafter is associated with reparative behavior and with left-sided asymmetry thought to be associated with increased approach motivation.

### Conclusions

Understanding the self-conscious emotions is critical to understanding the self. The field has made much progress in both theory and empirical work since the first comprehensive volume addressing the science of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (Tangney & Fischer, 1995), but there remain much fertile ground and many unanswered questions ripe for inquiry. Perhaps more than other emotions, the measurement of self-conscious emotions poses some real challenges. Although a number of measurement methods have been developed in recent years (see Robins, Nofhle, & Tracy, 2007, for a review), the coming decade will no doubt see improvements in our ability to capture these emotions, further fueling this burgeoning area of research.

### Note

1. We have adopted the terms *authentic* and *hubristic* to emphasize that the first facet (authentic pride) is based on actual accomplishments and is likely accompanied by genuine feelings of self-worth. This label also connotes the full range of academic, social, moral, and interpersonal accomplishments that may be important elicitors (in previous work [Tracy & Robins, 2004] this facet of pride was labeled with the narrower descriptor of "achievement-oriented"). However, the label *hubristic pride* should not be taken to imply

that this facet is not an authentic emotional experience. Rather, from our theoretical perspective at least, the *elicitors* of hubristic pride may be more loosely tied to actual accomplishments, and may involve a self-evaluative process that reflects a less authentic sense of self (e.g., distorted and self-aggrandized self-views), but the subjective experience is likely to be as genuine as that of any other emotion.

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## PART I

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